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ABSTRACT 
 
THE TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY AFTER THE 2000-2001 FINANCIAL 
CRISES: 
AN UNUSUAL CHAPTER WRITTEN BY THE FIRST JUSTICE AND 
DEVELOPMENT PARTY GOVERNMENT 
Afşar, Emre 
Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Ali Tekin 
 
October 2007 
 
 
 This thesis analyzes the five-year period of the Turkish political economy 
following the 2000-2001 financial crises. This five-year period signifies an important 
point of departure from the classical Turkish political economy as stable and rapid growth 
was sustained for over twenty consecutive quarters. The strong commitment to the fiscal 
discipline and to the powerful external anchors such as the IMF and EU were key to this 
success. The central question is what motivated the JDP government to show this long-
lasting commitment to the fiscal discipline and the external anchors particularly to the 
IMF-induced economic programs. Growing ties with the global economy, the new 
institutional framework, the new balance of power within the networks shaping the 
Turkish political economy and the successful implementation of the JDP’s prudent 
political economy agenda are the four plausible explanations for the central question. 
Each of these explanations is elaborated in a separate chapter and the growing ties with 
the global economy prevail as the most competent explanation since it directly 
contributes to the emerging of the other three explanations.    
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ÖZET 
 
2000-2001 EKONOMİK  KRİZLERİNDEN SONRA TÜRK EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİ: 
İLK ADALET VE KALKINMA PARTİSİ HÜKÜMETİ TARAFINDAN YAZILAN 
SIRADIŞI BİR BÖLÜM 
Afşar, Emre 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doç. Ali Tekin 
 
Ekim 2007 
 
  Bu tez, 2000-2001 ekonomik krizlerini takip eden beş senelik dönemdeki Türk 
ekonomi politiğini analiz etmiştir. İstikrarlı ve hızlı büyümenin arka arkaya 20 çeyrekten 
daha uzun bir süre devam ettirilmesi, bu beş yıllık dönemin klasik Türk ekonomi 
politiğinden önemli bir farklılık arz ettiğini göstermiştir. Mali disipline ve IMF ve AB 
gibi güçlü dış çıpalara gösterilen sıkı bağlılık bu başarıda anahtar olmuştur. Temel soru, 
nelerin AKP hükümetini mali disipline ve başta IMF destekli ekonomik programlara 
olmak üzere dış çıpalara bu uzun sureli bağlılığa teşvik ettiğidir. Küresel ekonomiyle 
gelişen bağlar, yeni kurumsal çerçeve, Türk ekonomi politiğini şekillendiren 
bağlantılardaki yeni kuvvetler dengesi ve AKP’nin ileri görüşlü ekonomi politiği 
programının başarıyla uygulanması temel soru için dört makul açıklamadır. Bu 
açıklamaların her biri ayrı bir bolümde incelenmekte ve diğer üç açıklamanın ortaya 
çıkmasındaki doğrudan katkısından dolayı küresel ekonomiyle gelişen bağlar en kapsamlı 
açıklama olarak öne çıkmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Ekonomi Politiği, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Kemal Derviş, 
IMF, AB, 2000-2001 Ekonomik Krizleri 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the better understanding of the recent Turkish political 
economy, which marked a point of departure from the traditional Turkish political 
economy, and the political party shaping this era, the Justice and Development Party 
(JDP). As a newborn political actor in the scene of roiled Turkish politics, the JDP gained 
a commanding electoral victory in the early general elections of November 2002. The 
Turkish voters gave a relatively unknown political movement the chance of being a 
single party government at a time when the country was at the crossroads of many 
important economic and political developments, as the European Union (EU) process 
entered a new phase after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, when Turkey earned the formal 
candidate status, and the economy was hit hard by the severest crisis of the Republic in 
2001.   
 
The Turkish economy especially after the capital account liberalization in 1989 witnessed 
a combination of long years of limited growth with major macroeconomic imbalances 
and a series of weak coalition governments unable to provide political stability. 
Consequently the average deposit interest rate between years 1991-2001 was 72.76 
 2 
percent while the average rate of consumer price inflation was 74.67 percent. In the same 
ten-year period the average rate of GDP growth was only 2.67 percent and displayed a 
very inconsistent pattern, with the growth rates ranging from -7.5 percent up to 8 
percent.1 
 
This negative outlook inevitably called for tighter fiscal discipline and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) support, two vital needs which could have been attained only for 
limited periods of time. The economic crises or stagnations forced the governments to 
take the bitter IMF pill, but when the macro economic balances were restored the 
commitment to fiscal discipline and IMF programs was quickly abandoned and populist 
and redistributive policies resumed. 
 
However, when Turkey suffered the severest crisis of all time in February 2001, 
something out of the ordinary pattern followed the crisis. After the initial recovery from 
the catastrophic effects of the crisis, the fiscal discipline remained in place and IMF 
anchor stayed powerful. In 2005 a new IMF stand-by agreement was signed in the 
absence of any economic crisis or sign of stagnation. In fact, let alone avoiding any 
economic crisis or stagnation, as of 2005 the Turkish economy recorded many stellar 
achievements. While the inflation rate has come down to 8.2 percent, the GDP growth 
had been robust and consistent averaging 7.5 percent in 2002-2005 period.   
 
While the previous coalition government (formed by the Democratic Left Party, 
Nationalist Movement Party and Motherland Party) provided the initial recovery within a 
                                                 
1
 The figures are taken from: (World Bank, 2006). 
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year after the 2001 crisis, the JDP government was in office in the following 5 years, 
which witnessed a rather unusual episode of Turkish political economy. The central 
question that this thesis will address is why the JDP did not return to populist and 
redistributive policies once the economy has bounced back from the 2001 crisis.  
 
There are many indicators of the central question. For example, the role of IMF did not 
diminish despite the positive economic outlook. As Evrensel (2004: 17) observes: 
“Turkey enters the next IMF program in worse macroeconomic condition than the 
previous program”. However, this habit was drastically broken when in 2005 Turkey 
entered an IMF program with far better macroeconomic conditions than prior to the 
previous program. The fiscal discipline remained tight with every year the 6.5 percent 
primary surplus target was achieved despite the available and tempting state resources 
enabling the government to engage in populist spending and redistributive policies which 
in return would bring more electoral popularity for the JDP in the next election.  
 
These indicators will be elaborated in Chapter 2, as it compares the characteristics of pre-
JDP and JDP eras political economy of Turkey. It is important to grasp the fundamentals 
of Turkish political economy in the pre-JDP era so that it would be easier to see the 
changes and continuities under the JDP government. Since the very depth of the 2001 
crisis has been instrumental in the post-2001 reshaping of the political and economic 
domains in Turkey, the 2001 crisis will be thoroughly analyzed. After establishing that 
there has been a fundamental departure from the “classical” Turkish political economy, 
the thesis will provide four different sets of plausible explanation for the central question 
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and each one of these explanations will be assessed in separate chapters. A comparative 
method will be used to expose the differences between the pre and post 2001 crisis 
Turkish political economy and consequently to form the main argument.2 
 
After providing the background information on Turkish political economy, Chapter 3 
gives the growing dependence of Turkey on the global economy as the first explanation 
for the long lasting fiscal discipline and the commitment to reform process. While the 
globalization has established closer ties through multiple channels in social, cultural and 
political spheres, as the neo-liberal complex interdependence theory claims, the global 
economic ties has been the most visible and influential element for Turkey.3 The intense 
flow of money and investment all around the world creates interdependence among the 
actors of the global economy and with its neo-liberalization efforts Turkey has become 
more and more involved with the global economy. After 1989 the Turkish economy has 
been prone to major current account deficits. The short-term foreign investments, a type 
of liquidity that is highly volatile by nature, finance this sizeable deficit. Thus in order to 
keep the money inflows coming, the Turkish policy makers especially after the February 
2001 crisis have been forced to act in line with the expectations of the domestic and 
foreign finance actors who value fiscal discipline, IMF-induced reform process and the 
European Union (EU) accession dearly.  
 
                                                 
2
 For a detailed explanation of the comparative method see: (George, 1979), (Lijphart, 1971). 
 
3
 For a detailed explanation of the neo-liberal complex interdependence theory see: (Keohane and Nye, 
1977). 
  
 5 
The fourth chapter of the thesis will cover the fundamental structural reform process that 
altered the institutional framework as another possible explanation for the unusual course 
of JDP’s policy practice since 2002. As Onis points out, a new regulatory state has been 
in the making with powerful independent regulatory agencies taking the center stage, by-
passing the political influence and backed up by the powerful external anchors of IMF 
and EU.4 While the IMF provided a road map for the reforms with the 2001 economic 
program and later with the 2005 standby agreement, the EU guided a sizeable portion of 
the reforms with its acquis communautaire. Also the 2001 crisis was instrumental to 
ignite the reform process including elements of de-regulation and re-regulation and many 
of the key reforms were made before the JDP government took office by the former 
Minister of Economy Kemal Dervis, who was the leading figure for economic reforms 
under the previous coalition government. The autonomy of Central Bank of Turkey 
(CBT) was significantly increased. Bank Regulatory and Supervisory Authority (BRSA) 
was reinvigorated. Direct income support replaced the previous ineffective agricultural 
subsidy system.  
 
Still there were many reforms to be implemented and the JDP administration continued to 
the constitution of the new institutional framework. The passage of new foreign direct 
investment (FDI) law, tax administration reform, monitoring the public employment and 
elimination of redundant positions, social security reform, revitalization of privatization 
program leading to major privatization sales such as Turkish Telecom (TT), continued 
reform on banking sector especially on supervisory and regulatory framework, 
administrative and parametric pension reform were all implemented by the JDP 
                                                 
4
 See (Onis, 2006a).   
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government through the IMF conditionality and harmonization with the acquis 
communautaire. As in the key sectors of economy such as banking, energy and 
telecommunication, either new independent regulatory agencies were established or the 
existing ones were empowered and with the swift privatization both additional revenues 
were made available and the clientist distribution of state resources had diminished in the 
post-2001 crisis trajectory. Thus the room for redistributive and populist practices was 
significantly decreased in the new institutional framework. This new setting is an 
influential factor that shapes the JDP’s unorthodox course of policy implementation. 
 
The fifth chapter will elaborate the shift in the networks shaping the Turkish political 
economy as a third explanation for the continued structural reform process and fiscal 
discipline in the JDP era of Turkish political economy. As Olson pointed out there are 
distributive coalitions forming political lobbies to influence politics in their favor.5 The 
2001 crisis was so severe and powerful that the existing system of networks tying this 
social distributive coalitions and political parties was largely abolished. Prior to the 2001 
crisis each political party was associated with a certain segment of the society and would 
pursue a political agenda that directly provided incentives to that particular segment when 
they took office. While the core social coalition supporting the JDP was composed of the 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the JDP aimed to meet the expectations of not 
only the SMEs but a broader coalition including the big business and fixed income 
groups. As it would be unattainable to provide specific incentives to each separate part of 
this broad coalition the JDP had to focus on policies that brings an overall improvement 
for the whole economy especially on the macro level such as reduction of the inflation 
                                                 
5
 See (Olson, 1982).  
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rate or speeding up the privatization which requires fiscal discipline and commitment to 
reform process.  
 
Connectedly the powerful effects of the 2001 crisis strengthened the hand of pro-reform 
coalition. The small distributive coalitions forming political lobbies in general are 
protectionist and anti-reformist in their agenda, as they benefit from the continuation of 
the existing structure in their area of interest. The most significant example showcasing 
this resistance to reform from a distributive coalition and shift of power is the banking 
sector. Prior to the 2001 crisis the powerful banking lobbies managed to block the reform 
proposals aiming to establishing a stronger BRSA with tight supervisory and regulatory 
tools. After the 2001 crisis, however, there have been achieved some fundamental 
structural reforms on the banking and finance sector as they have been widely accepted 
among the forerunning causes of the long-lasting macro economic problems in Turkey. 
One final major shift of power among key actors noticeably increased the influence of 
external actors. These external anchors contain not only the institutions such as the EU 
and IMF but also the private actors that intensely invested in Turkey after the 2001 crisis.   
 
The sixth chapter will acknowledge the contribution of the JDP government in the overall 
improvement of Turkish political economy in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. All the 
previous three alternate explanations in this thesis attribute the recent success of Turkey 
in maintaining fiscal discipline and continued reform process to structural factors. 
However, as a central agent the JDP deserves credit for successfully maneuvering within 
the new set of conditions in the post-2001 trajectory. To be more specific, the JDP 
 8 
realized that maintaining the high growth pattern which was initiated by the previous 
coalition government was going to bring absolute gains for each and every segment of the 
economy and society even though it required sticking the to IMF conditionality and tight 
fiscal discipline, two policies which are not favored by the SMEs that constitute the bulk 
of JDP’s social coalition.  
 
The thesis will end with a conclusion briefly recapping the central question and the 
alternate explanations of the puzzle. While recognizing the plausibility of each 
explanation and not ruling out any of them, the growing dependence on the global 
economy will be highlighted as the prime hypothesis answering the central question most 
competently since it is the facilitating factor for the other three explanations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY IN RETROSPECT 
 
 
2.1. The Liberalization Efforts 
 
The roots of recent political economy of Turkey date back to the stabilization program of 
1980. Until 1980 the economy had an inward orientation. Import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) model through state-directed plans constituted the base of this 
scheme. The primary goal was to avoid heavy reliance on foreign capital and keeping the 
economy manageable. As a result of this shortsighted policy, the record of Turkish 
economy had been timid and far from impressive.6  
 
The perennial economic crises caused by the foreign exchange shortages and the 
conditionality of the IMF and World Bank urged the Turkish policy makers to reorganize 
the economic structure. The first step towards the liberalization of the economy came 
with the stabilization program of January 1980. With devaluation of Turkish Lira (TL) 
and specific measures addressing export promotion such as subsidies for exporters, 
simplification of bureaucratic procedures and tax cuts on intermediate goods of export-
                                                 
6
 For detailed information on the ISI see: (Barkey, 1990). 
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oriented manufacturers, the state policy shifted from a closed economy guided by ISI 
model to a free market economy. 
 
Although the competitive neo-liberalism replaced the protectionist etatism as the 
development strategy of the state, the mindset of politicians had hardly changed at all. 
The neo-liberal economy requires a competition state that assumes a minimal role within 
the market.7 Solely providing a strong regulatory presence ought to be the fundamental 
function of the state. However, in the Turkish context protecting the invisible hand of the 
newly founded neo-liberal economy was not an appealing idea for the politicians who 
primarily sought to derive material benefits from the allocation of the state resources. As 
a result of this dichotomy, Turkey in theory shifted to neo-liberalism but in practice failed 
to provide the necessary political and economic foundations to fully materialize the neo-
liberal economic model.   
 
 
2.2. The Lost Decade of 1990 
 
The closed economy prior to 1980 caused a great hunger among Turkish consumers for 
high quality, luxurious and advanced technology import goods. The only available 
consumption avenue for Turkish people had long been the low quality import substituting 
products and so inevitably Turkish people had a feeling of what Zurcher (2004: 308) 
describes as “not having lived”. Thus when the liberalization process started Turkish 
                                                 
7
 For more information on the competition state see: (Cerny, 1998). 
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people chose to spend rather than save. The already low level of domestic savings 
became inadequate to generate enough capital accumulation for investment and 
industrialization.8 Therefore, the import of foreign capital to facilitate rapid economic 
growth seemed rather a prudent decision. Aside from the practical need also in theory, 
capital account liberalization is an integral part of any neo-liberal economy. Hence the 
establishment of the full convertibility of Turkish Lira (TL) in August 1989 was an 
expected policy implementation.9 However, in Turkish case where the competition 
capacity of economy with powerful effects of financial globalization was inadequate, 
major macroeconomic imbalances and political instabilities were present and proper 
regulations on the finance sector were lacking, this move caused rather problematic 
consequences by fully exposing the economy to the risks of financial globalization. “The 
consequence of this decision, in the midst of high degree of domestic economic and 
political instability, was that the Turkish economy’s performance became heavily 
dependent on highly volatile short-term capital flows with costly ramifications.” (Onis 
and Bakir, 2007: 5) The following decade of the 1990s witnessed a struggling growth 
pattern with a dizzying mix of economic boom and crisis. 
 
Table 1 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP 
Growth 
(annual 
%)  9.3 0.9 6.0 8.0 -5.5 7.2 7.0 7.5 3.1 -4.7 7.4 -7.5 
Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank 
                                                 
8
 For an extended analysis of the relation between domestic savings and investment in Turkey see: (Erden, 
2005). 
 
9
 For more information on the capital account liberalization see: (Ersel, 1996). 
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First and foremost the combination of available foreign capital, populist public spending 
and eager private consumption resulted in swift increase of public and private debt. 
Adding the chronic inflation and a series of weak coalition governments unable to 
provide fiscal discipline, the macro-economic problems started to grow.  
 
In about five years the premature capital account liberalization produced its first major 
financial crisis. The rise in foreign capital inflows and rapidly appreciating TL worsened 
the foreign trade deficit. Moreover, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) was 
swiftly increasing. These developments inevitably created, a budget deficit as of 1993 
that doubled what had been originally targeted, and cumulative inflation rate of 60 
percent within the first month of 1994. Additionally, to avoid the inflation tax, the 
dollarization became a common practice, which in return fueled the demand for foreign 
exchange. When the investors’ sentiment towards to credibility of government policies 
was reversed with the official ten percent devaluation of TL in February 1994, a quick 
outflow of very much demanded short-term foreign capital crushed the economy. The 
Ciller government announced a stabilization program in April 1994 backed up by an IMF 
stabilization program. While a quick recovery was achieved within a year, the collapse of 
the coalition government in September 1995 led to the termination of the IMF 
agreement.10 So this six year period starting with the capital account liberalization and 
ending with the termination of IMF agreement showcased all the traits of Turkish 
political economy prior to 2001 crisis such as the political instability, the strong effects of 
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed account of the 1994 financial crisis see: (Ozatay, 2000). 
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capital flows in and out the economy, weak commitment to fiscal discipline and IMF 
programs.  
 
 
2.3. Populism, Political Instability and Vicious Cycles 
 
While populism in economic policy can manifest itself in several different forms, Onis 
(2003: 3) describes populism as “Using state resources and manipulating economic 
outcomes in ways that disproportionately benefit select groups and classes, whose 
strength and support the elites relies on to maintain its rule”. The motivation behind 
populism is to maintain and if possible broaden the electoral support, which can be taken 
as an unintended consequence and deficiency of democracy.11  
 
In the multiparty era, growing distributional pressures became influential over the 
Turkish political parties. The shortsighted mindset that aims to save the day but ignores 
the long-term consequences became widespread among political parties. Choosing 
populist policies emerged as a common practice of Turkish politics. Populist policies, in 
general, bring short-term gains with long-term costs. But more importantly engaging in 
populism causes the neglect of the very much needed structural reforms and stabilization, 
which bring short-term costs and long-term benefits. For instance, the weak coalition 
governments relied on heavy borrowing to finance the massive public debt and postponed 
the long-term cost of this costly borrowing strategy to the following years.   
                                                 
11
 For more information on the historical account of the coexistence of the democracy and populism in 
Turkey see: (Keyder, 1987: 117-140). 
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So populism on the political front led to a distorted and unequal distribution of public 
resources. At the same time the liberalization process altered the ways that the 
government finances the public deficits. With the mushrooming private banks that 
emerged as prime lenders to the state, the domestic debt skyrocketed from almost zero 
percent of GDP in 1987 up to 30 percent in 2000. In other words, the already inadequate 
savings of the Turkish people, which ideally should have provided credit to real sector to 
invest and grow, was used to finance the public deficit, which was a direct result of 
mismanagement of the state finances.    
 
Additionally, the lack of proper regulation of financial sector was also one of the leading 
reasons why the economy struggled in post-1989 era. Taking advantage of the existing 
system in which the state was in constant need of borrowing to finance the enormous 
public debt, Turkish banks not only dedicated most of their existing capitals but also 
additionally borrowed heavily from foreign sources to invest in the highly profitable 
government bonds and securities market. Thus two major problems hit back the Turkish 
economy.  
 
First, the banking sector had emerged as the broker of the Turkish state’s borrowing from 
abroad and failed to implement its vital task of lending money for domestic investors 
especially the desperately credit seeking SMEs. Table 2, below, illustrates the 7-year 
period when the Turkish economy suffered 3 large-scale financial crises. Whereas Turkey 
belongs to the middle-income group, the availability of the credit to private sector is only 
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equal to those of low-income countries. This lack of credit availability emerged as one of 
the primary reasons for Turkey’s instable and inadequate growth performance throughout 
the early years of its liberal experience.  
 
Table 2 
Domestic Credit 
to Private Sector 
(% of GDP) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Low Income 
Countries 20.0 19.8 20.1 20.5 21.0 23.0 24.7 24.9 
Middle Income 
Countries 51.0 48.9 50.6 53.7 53.0 55.7 54.4 54.4 
High Income 
Countries 124.6 127.5 128.6 135.5 148.1 151.2 150.3 150.1 
World Average 111.5 113.2 113.3 118.4 127.4 133.2 131.4 130.7 
Turkey 17.1 19.5 24.0 27.5 24.2 23.5 24.6 21.7 
Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank. 
 
Second, Turkish banks had dangerously open positions in terms of foreign currencies. In 
other words, their profit was based on TL but they borrowed in foreign currencies and 
consequently any significant and quick depreciation of TL would have destructive effects 
on Turkish finance sector. This vulnerable system cost Turkey dearly when speculative 
attacks or political tensions triggered the outflow of short-term foreign capital most 
dramatically in November 2000 and February 2001.     
 
Moreover, the liberalization process with its growing macroeconomic imbalances such as 
high rates of inflation and constant depreciation of TL created groups of losers including 
urban workers, farmers and SMEs. Each political party sought to appeal to a specific 
loser group of the liberalization process. While not differentiating in major political and 
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ideological issues, leaders of political parties preferred to keep their dominant post 
hoping to gain access to incentive distributing capacity of state by gaining electoral 
success. This would enable them to provide extravagant material incentives to themselves 
and their constituencies ignoring the negative reflections upon the state budget.12  
 
This fragmented structure fueled the political instabilities and populist economic policies 
that in return caused even more macroeconomic imbalances and eventually long-lasting 
vicious cycles of political problems and economic stagnations. In such a difficult 
domestic setting in order to attract the volatile foreign capital extremely high real interest 
rates had been offered. This in return caused more debt and therefore another vicious 
cycle had come to exist. Also one of the main objectives of liberalization process is to 
capture the benefits of financial globalization of which Turkey has only managed to 
attract highly volatile short-term capital. Ideally the liberalization of Turkish economy 
should have brought long-term foreign direct investment (FDI). But in the absence of 
political and economic stability this goal was never achieved. 
 
By 1999 both domestic and foreign economic actors were aware of the growing 
macroeconomic imbalances that the Turkish economy has suffered all throughout the 
1990s. The coalition government in charge recognized this common perception and for 
the first time in Turkish history an IMF agreement was signed without experiencing a 
financial crisis.13 However, in the absence of any urgency to recover from a crisis the 
government acted rather reluctant to comply with demands of the IMF program. Even 
                                                 
12
 For further explanation on the patronage policy exercises in post-1980 period see: (Eder, 2003). 
 
13
 For a historical account of Turkey’s involvement with IMF see: (Evrensel, 2004). 
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countries suffering serious financial crisis in general act hesitant to take the bitter IMF 
pill as the Fund often seeks to switch or cut the expenditure policies in order to fix the 
short-term outlook of the macro economy. This type of policies hit hard the real economy 
and poorer segments of the society. So it is no mystery then why the national 
governments efficiently cooperate with the IMF only in times of crises and for a limited 
period of time.14   
 
A similar line of criticism of the neo-liberal mindset of IMF and its stabilization 
programs is that the unquestioned primacy of the financial sector over the real sector. To 
be more precise, as Keyman and Koyuncu (2005: 107) articulates the neo-liberal 
assumption of IMF and the 2001 “Transition Program of Turkey into Powerful 
Economy”:          
Without a strong and stable financial sector, economic growth would not be 
possible, and that shifting the focus of the economic program on production 
should be deferred until the sound political development and the stable 
macroeconomic rationality are to be achieved in Turkey. 
 
As the voice of real sector, for instance, MUSIAD had strongly opposed this economic 
program by claiming that its main goal is to save the banking sector and the capital of the 
big business in Turkey and would not bring any improvement to the real sector which 
was going through an extremely rough patch after the February 2001 crisis.15  
 
Speaking of IMF in Turkish context, the Fund was also unable to impose its 
conditionality concerning the much-needed structural reforms mainly due to the short-
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lived commitment by the Turkish side. So in practice the only support that IMF provided 
was the cheap credit that brought the boost to the economy to overcome the immediate 
effects of the financial crisis. Thus the IMF could be criticized for bailing out the 
governments, which successively engaged in populist policies and abandoned the fiscal 
discipline. Still these governments should be held responsible for the long lasting 
economic problems before the IMF. 
 
 
2.4. The Twin Crises 
 
In any economy where long-lasting economic problems and political instabilities are 
present, the financial crises need only a couple of minor negative developments to be the 
final straw. Turkish case for that matter is no exception. Some domestic and external 
dynamics simultaneously worked to trigger the financial crisis. 
 
On the domestic side the coalition government, despite the optimistic mood brought by 
the 1999 Helsinki Summit in which Turkey was given the formal candidate status and the 
1999 stabilization program supported by the IMF standby agreement, failed to meet the 
expectations of the market.16 As part of the IMF conditionality there should have been 
made some cuts in agricultural subsidies and some progress in the privatization sale of 
state assets in telecommunications. However, as what is perceived to be a sign of lack of 
cohesion within the coalition and the determination to implement the IMF program, the 
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ultra-nationalist NMP blocked the implementation of these key issues. As a result the 
investor confidence towards Turkish economy and the government’s commitment to the 
IMF stand-by agreement had diminished. The widening current account deficit also 
raised questions concerning the sustainability of the economic program and the optimistic 
mood. With quickly decreasing interest rates the domestic consumption boom had come 
to exist and in turn fuelled the current account deficit. Adding the high energy prices in 
2000 the current account deficit emerged as the major concern over the Turkish economy. 
Moreover the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake hit hard the supply side of the economy as the 
city produced 17 percent of overall manufacturing in Turkey.17 
 
The international context also helped the triggering of the speculative attacks. In the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis the investors’ sentiment towards the emerging markets 
took a negative turn. Thus even minor problems in domestic front would be blown out of 
proportion by the international investors and the room for speculative attacks had grown 
significantly. The Russian crisis of 1998 also contributed to the negative perception of 
global financial actors towards emerging markets but more importantly hit hard the 
Russian economy where the 25 percent of total Turkish exports are destined. Thus the 
Turkish export numbers fell significantly.18 
 
Nonetheless the November 2000 crisis was a simple liquidity crisis mainly affecting the 
private banks. Hence its magnitude was limited and the economy managed to overcome 
the crisis situation rather quickly. However, the February 2001 crisis was the severest 
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crisis that the Turkish economy has ever experienced. It was triggered by the 
confrontation between the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister Bulent 
Ecevit during a National Security Council (NSC) meeting and escalating to a point where 
Sezer threw the booklet of constitution at Ecevit.  
 
The results were catastrophic. In the day of the NSC meeting 5.1 billion dollars worth of 
foreign capital left the country.19 Overnight interest rates skyrocketed to 7500 percent 
while the Treasury gave 144 percent interest rate for one-month bonds. Within three days 
the stock exchange index declined by 29.4 percent. The controlled (pre-announced) 
exchange rate policy was replaced by free floating of the exchange rate two days after the 
crisis broke out. In the first day of free-floating system TL depreciated 39.75 percent 
against the dollar.20  
 
Overall in the year of 2001 the GNP declined by 9.4 percent, which is the worst single-
year performance in the history of Turkish economy, while an estimated one million 
people including educated and skilled labor lost their jobs. Many SMEs declared 
bankruptcies. The inflation rate rose by 55.9 percent.21 In sum, the 2001 crisis turned out 
to be the severest crisis of Turkish history. It directly affected the lives of almost every 
segment of the Turkish society. The very depth of the 2001 crisis was instrumental in the 
makings of the new institutional framework that will be elaborated in chapter 4 and the 
new balance of power within the Turkish political economy that will be elaborated in 
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chapter 5. Thus the aftermath of the crisis witnessed some profound and groundbreaking 
changes in Turkey.22  
 
 
2.5. The Dervis Factor 
 
Kemal Dervis, a distinguished economist with a bright career in the World Bank, was 
appointed eleven days after the crisis broke out as the Minister of State responsible for 
the Economy. He was given the role of a supra-technocrat who was above the daily 
politics. The presence of Dervis was deemed important to repair the torn confidence 
towards the Turkish economy especially among the international financial circles. The 
fact that he is being the leading figure and the architect of the Turkey’s new economic 
program, “Transition to Strong Economy Program”, also helped to provide the support of 
IMF for a new agreement. Dervis himself identified establishing a trustful environment as 
the most urgent element of immediate economic recovery.23 In order to achieve the high-
trust environment not only tight fiscal and monetary policies but also addressing the more 
deep structural problems was needed. 
 
Dervis indeed successfully addressed the underlying structural reasons for the long-
lasting economic problems. First, the public spending was not transparent with more than 
70 independent funds spending a significant share of the budget without supervision. The 
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agricultural subsidies based on base price support have long proved to be inefficient for 
most farmers. The tax base was inadequate while most of the revenue was earned from 
regressive taxation. The privatization of inefficient state economic enterprises (SEEs) 
was insufficient and problematic. The energy, telecommunication and banking sectors 
needed strong independent regulatory agencies. The deregulation of key markets such as 
tobacco, sugar, gas and electricity and improving the pension system were deemed 
necessary. Not only the autonomy of central bank was essential to reduce the inflationary 
pressures but also the reforming of public banks was important to cut the ways of 
populist policies leading to reckless public spending.24 
 
Within a year the macro-economic figures proved the fact that the Turkish economy 
shook off the devastating effects of the 2001 crisis. In 2002 the growth was restored with 
7.9 percent, inflation rate came down to 29.7 percent, and the reserves of Central Bank of 
Turkey (CBT) rose to 26.7 billion USD. But more importantly the ongoing reform 
process started with the IMF-supported economic program paved the way for a longer 
term and stable economic growth. 
 
 
2.6. The JDP Era 
 
While the single party government was broadly welcomed there were also non-negligible 
concerns concerning the JDP. First, the party had genetic ties with political Islam in 
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Turkey which historically opposed the EU and IMF involvement, had experienced 
confrontations with the secularists segments of the country including the Army and 
TUSIAD and previously displayed a pair of poor performances when it took the office.25 
It was also established only one year prior to the elections, which brought question marks 
concerning the experience and competence of party in office. Finally the electoral support 
of party was based on a broad social coalition and the JDP could have very well been 
tempted to populist policies in order to keep this broad and diverse coalition satisfied.    
 
The JDP government, however, proved these concerns wrong. Instead of engaging in a 
populist spending policy to satisfy its broad electoral coalition the full commitment to the 
ongoing reform process with the help of powerful external anchors of IMF and EU was 
maintained. Regarding the competence of the party, the bold initiative that was taken 
when the delicate issue of Cyprus had become a major stumbling block on Turkey’s path 
to EU accession had proved the party to be capable of successfully tackling sensitive 
issues. The last major concern regarding the JDP government, which was the possible 
confrontation with the hyper-secular establishment within the state, did not materialized 
except for the Higher Education Bill, a policy initiative that was considered as a sizeable 
concession to the Islamists and consequently led to a serious political tension. However, 
JDP did not force this controversial issue and backed down on its demand to implement 
the Bill.26 Leaving aside this single incident the Erdogan administration transferred the 
issue of extending religious rights and freedoms to the EU front. In other words, any 
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reform paving the way for extending controversial religious issues was taken within the 
context of the EU reform agenda.  
 
While the role of EU has significantly increased after the 1999 Helsinki Summit when 
Turkey was given the formal candidate status, in the post-2001 context the 
democratization reforms urged by the EU have come to be perceived as an integral part 
of the economic reform process.  
Market participants which were the principal actors promoting economic reform       
also became strong supporters of EU conditionality, primarily for its economic 
benefits. As a consequence, the coalition government in power was not able to 
resist the kind of far-reaching democratization reforms implemented during the 
summer of 2002. This was due to the fact that the failure to implement such 
reforms would mean a loss of trust on the part of the market participants in the 
government’s ability to maintain the momentum of the economic recovery 
process. Markets, in a way, became an instrument of political reform. Political 
reforms, in turn, helped to generate greater confidence in Turkey’s ability to 
create a favorable climate for domestic and foreign investment. (Onis and Bakir, 
2007: 13) 
 
By its nature the IMF is a short-term anchor. Its duties start with the worsening of macro 
economic indicators and end when the immediate financial difficulties are overcome. 
Hence it is instrumental to bring in short-term foreign investment to the country as long 
as it successfully complies with the IMF discipline. The only anchor that is capable of 
providing a longer-term investment, guidance and influence in Turkish case is the EU. 
Not only the accession process is a long one but it also requires some deep and permanent 
structural changes. Once the membership is obtained the investor confidence improves 
significantly as a sound functioning market economy with a democratic political structure 
emerges in an irreversible fashion. Statistically every state that started the negotiation 
process wound up earning the full member status. Thus there has been a significant boost 
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in the amount of long-term foreign investment yielded towards Turkey after the 
negotiation process officially started in October 2005.  
 
Another important element of EU’s appeal for Turkey has been the material benefits that 
are offered in many different forms of direct fund transfers. Especially after most of the 
Turkish people suffered from the devastating economic losses of the 2001 crisis the 
public support towards the EU membership had notably increased with the motivation of 
deriving direct material benefits from the process.27 “In Turkey we found solid optimism 
about the personal benefits of possible EU membership.”(European Commission, 2001a: 
59) So not only the business oriented market participants but also the ordinary people 
containing all different segments of economy and society united under the common goal 
of obtaining the EU membership.28    
 
Turning back to the IMF, aside from the structural reforms, the IMF conditionality also 
forced the Turkish policy makers to maintain the fiscal discipline and the JDP 
administration responded well by keeping the fiscal discipline in place at any cost. One 
dramatic example for that matter is the confrontation with hazelnut producers. The JDP 
government stood firm and has not submitted to the high price demands of the vast 
hazelnut producing agricultural sector. This policy could reflect badly upon JDP’s 
electoral fortune in northeast Turkey but it indicates that the JDP is, unlike the preceding 
governments, not inclined to apply populist policies but it rather prioritizes the higher 
goal which in this case being the keeping the public debt at minimum. 
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Between the years 2002 and 2004 “56000 redundant positions in State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs) have been eliminated.”(IMF 2004: 20) This again is an unusual policy 
practice as the employment in SEEs has been long used for political purposes. Instead of 
providing jobs for its constituencies the JDP government acted in line with the demands 
of IMF and eliminated redundant positions. In other words, the JDP chose a bitter IMF 
conditionality over a populist inclination that would eventually bring electoral popularity.     
 
Another striking example of JDP’s commitment to the IMF induced reforms and fiscal 
discipline is the tight regulation on banking sector. SMEs which constitute the bulk of 
JDP’s social coalition fiercely opposed the tight control on the banking sector as they 
continuously sought credit and in general had a hard time to access bank credits, as 
oppose to the big business conglomerates which either own their own banks or easily find 
credits due to their reputation.29 On the other hand the inadequate regulation of banking 
sector especially after the current account liberalization is widely considered as the prime 
cause of Turkey’s economic problems throughout the 1990s. Hence IMF persistently 
pushed for tighter regulation of banking sector. The JDP sided with IMF and continued 
the reform process of banking sector especially on supervisory and regulatory framework 
despite the opposition of SMEs. 
 
All in all the JDP era witnessed some stellar achievements in terms of Turkey’s long 
lasting economic problems. After 32 years of time the inflation rate has come down to 
single digits and consequently the interest rates decreased and confidence in TL has 
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improved greatly. Commercial banks’ engagement in productive lending has increased 
significantly. For the first time in the post-1980 structure the economy recorded GDP 
growth for more than twenty consecutive quarters and connectedly the ratio of public 
debt to the GNP came down to 44.8 percent in 2006 from the 90.4 percent in 2001.  
 
Considering the weak record of Turkish policy-makers in maintaining fiscal discipline 
and commitment to IMF-induced structural reforms, it is all very intriguing as to what 
drove the JDP government to distinguish itself from the preceding ones. Why was the 
bitter IMF pill taken in the absence of any economic crisis or why the populist and 
patronage politics were not implemented. The coming chapters will introduce four 
alternative explanations to answer these questions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE 
INCREASING ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN POST-2001 
CRISIS TURKEY 
 
 
Turkey has established extensive ties with global financial actors especially after the 
capital account liberalization in 1989. However, in the presence of Turkey’s long-lasting 
economic weaknesses and deficiencies, which were outlined in the previous chapter, this 
relation with the global finance actors has been a rather lopsided one. As a result of this 
asymmetry, Turkish economy has become more and more dependent on the inflow of 
short-term foreign funds mainly due to the current account deficit. As Onis (2006: 23) 
puts it “The manner in which the economy has been integrated into the global economy 
and the global financial markets severely constrains the options available to particular 
governments, to which the JDP government is no exception.”  
 
Especially in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis a unique structure has come to exist with the 
synchronized work of multiple factors and both the amount and the role of short-term 
foreign investment in Turkish economy reached its peak point. This increasing role of 
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global finance actors and their investment in Turkish economy will be elaborated in this 
chapter as the first set of explanation for the unusual episode of Turkish political 
economy which has been taking place since the February 2001 economic crisis.  
 
 
3.1. The Story of the Current Account Deficit in the Post-2001 Crisis Turkey 
 
Turkey has a long history of current account deficit, but in the post-2001 crisis era, it 
emerged as the prime cause of concern for the Turkish economy. The backbone of this 
long-lasting problem has been the enormous foreign trade deficit. In the 2002-2006 
period the foreign trade deficit exceeded the current account deficit by $8 billion on 
average per annum. 
 
Table 3 
Yearly (million $) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Current Account Balance 
-1,521 -8,036 -15,601 -22,603 -31,654 
Foreign Trade Balance -7,283 -14,010 -23,878 -33,530 -40,176 
Source: Turk Stat 
 
There are two main elements of the long-lasting foreign trade deficit. First, Turkey is and 
has always been a net importer of energy, a main component of intermediate good 
imports. With the growing population and economy, the demand for energy displayed an 
upward curve and as of 2006 reached its zenith. According to IMF (2006: 12) “Each 
dollar increase in the price of oil translates into a 0.1 percent of GNP deterioration of the 
current account”. While Turkey’s demand for oil has been increasing rapidly, the price of 
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oil has followed a similar trend in the meantime. The yearly basket price of Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) per barrel of oil was $24.36 in 2002 and in 
the following 5 years it went steadily up to $61.08 in 2006.  
 
Table 4 
Yearly ($) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Yearly Basket Price of Oil 24.36 28.1 36.05 50.64 61.08 
Source: OPEC 
 
The energy that Turkey imports is not limited only to oil. Turkey has signed multiple 
agreements with Russia and Iran for the import of natural gas, which is one of the main 
import items in form of energy, above the market prices.   
 
Second, the lack of technological capabilities in Turkish manufacturing sector creates a 
constant need of import of the investment (also known as capital good) and intermediate 
goods. Most of the medium and large industrial entrepreneurs need to import investment 
goods to start or enlarge their business. That is to say, in order to increase production and 
facilitate growth, Turkey needs import first. Once the industrial facility has been 
established, the production still requires import of intermediate goods. While the energy 
is one of the main sources of intermediate good imports, there are many other forms of 
intermediate goods. To give an example, Turkish company Vestel is the biggest 
television manufacturer in Europe. However, the display device, the main component of a 
television set, which turns the electrical signals into visible light and images, is produced 
by the Korean company Samsung. Hence the lack of technological and innovative 
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capabilities of the Turkish manufacturers causes the Turkish production pattern to rely 
largely on the imports. Turkey’s import numbers clearly indicates this heavy reliance on 
imports of investment and intermediate goods. 
 
Table 5 
Yearly (million $) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Capital Goods 8,400 11,326 17,397 20,363 23,148 
Intermediate Goods 37,656 49,735 67,549 81,868 98,623 
Source: Turk Stat 
 
In the 2002-2006 period the average rate of increase in import of intermediate goods was 
26.8 percent. In nominal terms the annual total of intermediate goods has reached $98.6 
billion in 2006 whereas this number was $37.6 in 2002. The same trend can be observed 
in investment goods too. The average rate of increase was 34.6 percent and the nominal 
number has come up to $23.1 billion in 2006 from $8.4 billion in 2002.   
 
While Turkish economy is in heavy need of import, the foreign trade deficit has another 
aspect. The deficit is a mere result of imports outnumbering the exports. So if there is a 
growing deficit in foreign trade balance, one has to consider the lack of adequate export 
growth. In the post 2001 context the TL has sharply appreciated due to the intense inflow 
of liquidity to the economy. The growing appetite for risky investments on the side of 
global financial actors caused this inflow of liquidity in post 2001 crisis era. The 
emerging markets stood out as the prime source of major gains for the global investors 
with a substantial risk factor due to the common economic and political problems 
associated with these markets. Moreover the interest rates all over the world especially in 
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developed countries were unusually low and at the same time the growth rate for the 
global economy has been strong which leads to a significant increase in the amount of 
liquidity used for investment. In such a favorable context the CBT offered high real 
interest rates, which have been a major attraction for the global financial actors to 
channel their portfolio investments to Turkey.  
 
On March 1 2002, a date that Dervis describes as the beginning of the stabilization for the 
economy, the dollar was valued to 1.38 TL. Exactly 4 years later the value was down to 
1.30 TL in spite of 68 percent cumulative inflation in the meantime. Even the prime 
minister himself criticized the value of TL and CBT for causing the appreciation of the 
currency by keeping the real interest rates high.30 The CBT, on the other hand, stands 
firm as its ultimate goal is to achieve the inflation target and price stabilization. 
Decreasing the interest rates would jeopardize both of these goals. Moreover, in the 
presence of the growing current account deficit which is primarily financed by the inflow 
of short-term foreign investment (also known as hot money) decreasing the interest rate 
might lead to a sudden capital flight to the country and potentially leading to a large-scale 
economic turbulence.  
 
Despite the constantly appreciating TL, the export numbers still managed to grow thanks 
to the increasing productivity and the stabilizing effect of disinflation on wages.  
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Table 6 
Yearly (million $) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Export 36,059 47,253 63,167 73,476 85,502 
Source: Turk Stat 
 
Yet the export growth could not keep up with the pace of imports. Consequently the ratio 
of exports to the GNP increased by 1.5 percent while the ratio of imports to the GNP rose 
6.1 percent in the 2002-2006 period. One of the reasons for this difference is the need for 
capital and intermediate goods import as a precondition for production growth. The other 
reason is the central role of the strong domestic demand in the rapid economic growth 
process. The decreasing interest rates after 2001 crisis accompanied by the improving 
tools of banking sector due to the significant penetration of the foreign banks in the 
Turkish banking sector resulted in a consumer credit boom. As it was stated previously, 
Turkish economy relies heavily on the imports of capital and intermediate goods. When 
the economy grew rapidly after the 2001 crisis, the import numbers skyrocketed to boost 
the supply. However, the domestic market mainly demanded this supply and thus it did 
not reflect equally well upon the export growth. So as a result, the recent rapid economic 
growth further contributed to the foreign trade and consequently current account deficits.  
 
The other effect of overvalued TL can be traced in the imports. Combined with the 
Turkish consumer’s eager demand for technological and high quality consumption goods 
the increasing value of TL contributed to the rising numbers of consumption good 
imports. Speaking in numbers, the cumulative import of consumption goods in 2002 was 
$4.8 billion and this number has come up to $16 billion in 2006. 
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Table 7 
Yearly (million $) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Consumption Goods 4,898 7,813 12,100 13,975 16,019 
Source: Turk Stat 
 
Whilst the imports of investment and intermediate goods have a positive return as they 
generates production in long-term and their import is merely out of necessity, the 
consumption goods do not have any such positive return nor they are absolute needs but 
rather a choice that solely contributes to the widening foreign trade deficit.  
 
Aside from the foreign trade deficit there are other factors contributing to the current 
account deficit. Since Turkish people prefer to spend their money rather than saving it, 
domestic savings have long been inadequate and when the TL started a constant 
appreciation phase after the 2001 crisis the private consumption peaked. The 
consumption boom narrowed the room for domestic savings and thus the need of the 
Turkish economy in general, but primarily the private sector, to import foreign capital to 
finance their investments grew rapidly, which clearly reflects upon the short-term debt. 
Back in 2002 the number for private sector’s short-term debt stood around $15 billion 
whereas the same figure reached almost $40 billion in 2006.    
 
Table 8 
Yearly (billion $) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Short-Term External Debt 16.4 23.0 31.9 37.1 42.0 
Source: Turk Stat 
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3.2. The May-June Turbulence 
 
Between the early May and late June of 2006 Turkish economy experienced a set of 
unpleasantly rapid shifts in major macroeconomic indicators due to a negative change in 
international investors’ sentiment towards emerging markets. During the turbulence the 
overnight interest rate of CBT rose almost 30 percent, TL depreciated more than 30 
percent. The stock market was also affected negatively and experienced a swift downturn. 
This economic turbulence was especially significant as it revealed the serious 
vulnerabilities in the Turkish economy despite its impressive run after the 2001 crisis and 
set a valuable example for how quickly the political and economic conditions can change 
to produce a financial turmoil. 
 
As it was highlighted earlier, the current account deficit had been on the rise in the post 
2001 crisis era and as of May 2006 it reached almost 9 percent of the GNP whereas 
according to the IMF (2006b: 9, 12) it should stand in the region of 4 percent. So the 
existing concerns on the sustainability of the deficit have reached to a new high point. 
This risk of financing the growing current account deficit was covered by the intense 
inflow of global liquidity. However, the global risk aversion increased abruptly and 
triggered a sell-off trend in emerging markets in mid spring. The Turkish economy was 
hit harder than any other emerging markets mainly due to the presence of domestic 
political and economic problems at that time.      
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First, the one-year rolling inflation rate came out much higher than the program targets 
for April and May respectively, reaching almost to the double digits with more than 9 
percent mainly due to the slight loosening up of the fiscal discipline from late 2005 
onwards. Since the chronic inflation has long been a major problem of Turkish economy, 
this upward trend in inflation rate had created second thoughts in the minds of investors 
regarding the sustainability of the recent economic success. Second, the reform process at 
the same time had also significantly slowed down with the program delays including the 
pension reform, tax reform, banking supervision and privatization of state banks.  
 
The pension law, here, requires a more comprehensive look. The social security deficit 
was widely perceived as a major source of public debt and IMF conditionality urged a 
reform concerning the issue. “Without reform, the overall social security deficit was 
projected to more than double in the long run from its current level of 4.5 percent of 
GNP.”(IMF, 2005: 31) The JDP government did his part and passed the related reform 
from the parliament unlike the other delayed reforms. However, the President vetoed the 
eagerly anticipated reform on pension reform law and consequently it directly contributed 
to the making of the May-June turbulence.  
 
The developments on the political front contributed to the snowballing of this negative 
mood in investors’ confidence. A series of events brought the secularist-Islamist divide to 
the headlines. First, the President, who has been extremely sensitive on the issue of 
secularism, twice vetoed the proposed candidates for the central bank governor and the 
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appointment process overall took more than a month from mid March to late April 
causing an air of uncertainty in the markets. Although it was never explicitly indicated, 
the reason for the Presidential veto was believed to be the Islamist background of the 
candidates proposed by the government.       
  
In mid May, the terrorist attack on the Presidency of Council of State leading to the 
killing of a judge escalated the political tension to dangerously high levels. The suspect 
indicated that the decision of the Council to confirm the ban on the headscarf was the 
reason behind his terrorist act. The incident led the President Ahment Necdet Sezer to 
publicly voicing his concerns on the danger of rising fundamentalist Islam to the secular 
establishment of the Turkish Republic. The secularist-Islamist divide, a major source of 
political tension, which was kept under the radar by the JDP government, inevitably re-
surfaced. In the funeral ceremony of the deceased high court judge the members of JDP 
cabinet were protested in a rather unusually strong and intense manner while the 
President, generals, high court judges and members of Higher Education Board, who 
were all perceived as the symbols of the secularism, received massive support from the 
crowd. This mounting political tension generated a negative perception in the markets, as 
it is capable of triggering a financial crisis. 
 
On the EU front, although the negotiation process had started, “The EU was critical of 
the limited progress Turkey had made on a range of political reforms, and laid down 
markers on Cyprus that many observers interpreted as foreshadowing difficulties in EU 
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relations later in 2006.”(IMF, 2006: 9)31 Since the EU had emerged as a powerful anchor 
in the post 2001 crisis era guiding the reform process, this negative signal sent by the 
Union yielded a loss in the investor’s confidence regarding the future status of Turkish 
politics and economy. Also the upcoming elections of President and general election in 
2007 were seen as potential sources of political instabilities. On the economic side of the 
election environment, Turkish political parties historically have been prone to engaging 
in populist line of public spending to boost their electoral popularity as the general 
election nears. All in all, markets were getting increasingly aware that these 
developments might lead the distortion of fragile balances of the markets in medium-
term.   
 
Nevertheless, the TL and stock market quickly recovered their losses after the turbulence 
ended in late June but the interest rates remained relatively high. The inflation rate also 
got a boost from the fluctuation as the program target rate was doubled for the year 2006. 
While the quick and rather smooth recovery process and the ability to contain the 
magnitude of crisis at minimum demonstrates the resiliency of the economic 
achievements since the 2001 crisis, the fact that Turkey among all the major emerging 
markets faced the most dramatic effects of the global liquidity movements clearly unveils 
the existing vulnerabilities in the Turkish economy. This turbulence presented the fact 
that Turkish economy still operates on highly variable and fragile terms and thus the 
policy makers do not have any spare room to alter the path the country has been taking 
since the 2001 crisis. To be more specific, distancing from the anchors of EU and IMF, 
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loosening up the tight fiscal control, slowing down the pace of structural reform process, 
and igniting a domestic political tension are needed to be avoided at any cost. 
 
 
3.3 The Implications of the Reliance on the Short-Term Foreign Capital 
upon the Political Economy of JDP 
 
In the age of financial globalization, it is quite natural for liberalizing Turkey to be 
interdependent with the global finance actors. However, the nature of this relationship has 
been more of a one-sided reliance on the part of Turkey rather than a mutual dependence. 
The dangerously high level of current account deficit is a clear manifestation of Turkey’s 
reliance on (mostly short-term) foreign capital. Not only does this reliance reflect the 
existing structural deficiencies of the economy, but it also poses a significant risk to the 
well being of the Turkish economy. Managing the growing current account deficit with 
highly volatile global liquidity is widely perceived as the leading problem of JDP era 
Turkey. This thesis, contrary to the common perception, argues that the need to finance 
the current account deficit via the short-term foreign portfolio investment has a bright 
side as it serves a strong anchor duty in forcing the JDP government to act in line with the 
expectations of the markets. 
 
The May-June turbulence proved that the reversal of the positive sentiment of the global 
investors is capable of triggering a full-scale financial crisis. The global liquidity has a 
highly volatile nature. If the interest rates rise in developed markets or the world 
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economy enters a recession phase, the channeling of global liquidity towards the risky 
emerging markets would drop significantly. So there is very good chance that factors 
purely external to Turkey’s economy might distort the liquidity inflow to the country. In 
the presence of such a potential threat, the domestic conditions should be kept in best 
possible state. To be more specific, any domestic political tension or economic stagnation 
is capable of triggering a rapid outflow of the already volatile portfolio investment. 
 
Despite all its recent achievements Turkey is still an emerging market with some major 
economic imbalances. If the money supply flooding from foreign investors were abruptly 
cut then financing the current account deficit would become extremely difficult. Like in 
the February 2001 crisis, the interest rates would have to be raised to dangerously high 
levels so that the foreign investors in the Turkish economy would not sell-off their TL 
assets and additional foreign portfolio investment could be appealed. In short term, the 
total debt would skyrocket because the depreciating TL translates into lesser volume of 
unit foreign currency. In other words, if hypothetically TL depreciates by 20 percent 
against the dollar, the overall debt stock of Turkey in terms of dollar instantly increases 
by 20 percent. In the long run, the payments of the high interest rate returns would further 
worsen the debt stock. 
 
While the aforementioned effects of a possible financial crisis might be overcome in a 
rather quick fashion, the credibility of the Turkish economy would not be equally easy to 
restore. It took years for the Turkish economy after the 2001 crisis to convince both the 
domestic and foreign investors that the country has achieved decent stability in terms of 
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economic and political structure, and promises a bright future with a full-on structural 
reform process underway.  
 
The more economic crisis takes place in an economy, the more difficult it gets to achieve 
the high-trust environment. If a new financial crisis much like the one in 2001 recurs, it 
would be much more difficult to restore weakened investor confidence. Also this weak 
record increases the risk factor associated with the Turkish economy and consequently 
makes the already volatile short-term portfolio investment all the more volatile. So the 
JDP government needed to act more carefully to prevent any major financial crisis from 
breaking out than the all previous governments.  
 
A potential financial crisis would not only have destructive effects on the Turkish 
economy but also the JDP itself would lose much of is electoral popularity. After the 
2001 crisis the voters punished the members of the coalition government in office harshly 
by leaving all three of them under the 10 percent parliamentary threshold. In case of a 
similar financial crisis the JDP as the single party government in charge would very 
likely to face a same kind of reaction from the public. Thus the JDP had to avoid any 
bold move such as engaging in a populist line of public spending, quitting the IMF-
stabilization program, abandoning the EU reform process or escalating political tension 
regarding the secularist-Islamist divide with forcing sensitive issues like headscarf and 
religious schools that might trigger a full-scale financial crisis. In other words, if the JDP 
wanted to maintain its dominant position in the parliament, it had to comply with the 
commonly shared expectations of the markets and the public in general. Therefore, it is 
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safe to say that the macroeconomic problems, the current account deficit in particular, 
serves a safeguard role in the post-2001 crisis era. 
 
The macroeconomic problems need classification. Unemployment, for example, is a 
major macroeconomic problem. However, by its nature, it is not capable of rapidly 
triggering a large-scale financial crisis. It may limit the economic growth and distort the 
income distribution, but these problems have mostly tolerable long-term ramifications. 
Problems such as current account deficit, on the other hand, operate on short-term scale. 
If the deficit grows or the financing for the deficit dries up, it exposes a major short-term 
macroeconomic problem. If the deficit cannot be sustained, it instantly triggers a financial 
turmoil. Thus the macroeconomic problems operating on short-term scale serve as 
invisible anchors over the governments, of which Turkey’s and JDP government is no 
exception.   
 
The urgency to manage the current account deficit narrows the opportunity space of the 
JDP government in a positive manner. For instance, the government would most likely 
prefer to aim for a much lesser primary surplus than the existing 6.5 percent standard. 
With a more relaxed budget the JDP could increase public spending which paves the way 
for more popular policy implementations such as offering high agricultural prices or tax 
relief. However, in the post 2001 context the markets performed an audit task and any 
inclination towards engaging in a populist line of economic policies or slowing down the 
structural reform process was largely prevented. If the JDP would have loosened up the 
fiscal discipline or slowed down the reform process, the markets as in the May-June 
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turbulence would punish the economy by selling off Turkish assets and liquidity outflow 
would follow. In order to avoid such a financial turmoil, the JDP government was forced 
to provide a suitable economic and political environment for the external sources of 
finance to which maintaining the positive mood in the markets is the key.  
 
Not only the short-term portfolio investment but also the attraction of the long-term 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Turkish economy emerged as a primary goal in the 
presence of the widening current account deficit. Much like the short-term portfolio 
investment, in order to attract FDI the Turkish economy and politics should first and 
foremost give a positive outlook to the investor. In the absence of political and economic 
stability, sufficient levels of FDI cannot be attained as it was proved in Turkey prior to 
the 2001 crisis. In the post 2001 era with the successful implementation of the structural 
reforms on both political and economic arenas, which also includes the improvement of 
the investment climate, and enhancing macroeconomic figures, the FDI numbers 
improved significantly.  
 
Table 9 
Million ($) 1990-2001 
average 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FDI Inflow 
(annual)  1,002 1,137 1,752 2,883 9,813 19,797 
Source: CBT 
 
Since the FDI is a long-term commitment, the investors seek for permanent guarantees to 
secure their costly investments. The decision of the EU in December 2004 to open up the 
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formal membership negotiations with Turkey was, therefore, the main reason behind the 
FDI boom that has been taking place after the 2004.    
 
As the May-June turbulence showcased, in spite of its recent achievements, the Turkish 
economy rests on very fragile balances and the risk of experiencing a financial crisis is 
still present at large especially due to the widening current account balance and the heavy 
reliance on the highly volatile short-term foreign portfolio investment in financing the 
deficit. Being aware of this fact, the JDP has been following a careful political economy 
agenda, which has two main facets. First, the JDP government aims to avoid any major 
domestic political problem that may trigger a financial turmoil. Second, it intends to keep 
the investor’s sentiment positive. In order to achieve this second goal, the fiscal discipline 
remained tight, the conditionality of the IMF stand-by agreement was successfully met 
and the reforms required for the EU accession were made. Therefore, it is safe to say that 
the widening current account deficit problem forced the JDP to follow a unique political 
economy, which clearly indicates a point of departure from the classical Turkish political 
economy as the fiscal discipline and reform process has been maintained for extensive 
periods of time.     
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE POST-2001 INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK ON THE TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 
Turkey initiated its liberalization process almost three decades ago. While the early years 
of the transition was seen as a success story with the rapid industrialization and surge in 
the exports, the following years of the liberalization experience showed a dismal 
performance. In the absence of the proper neo-liberal state restructuring, the state 
remained largely involved with economics. The politicians who seek to address the 
interests of the specific social groups constituting their electoral base used the rent 
distributing capacity of the state. Consequently, populist policies aiming to respond the 
distributional pressures of the various social groups deeply distorted the macroeconomic 
balances. Adding the political instabilities after 1987, Turkish economy experienced three 
major financial crises within seven years.  
 
The last and the most powerful crisis hit the country in 2001. Despite its harsh 
consequences, the 2001 crisis paved the way for many important developments in 
Turkish political economy. The shift towards a kind of competition state in line with the 
neo-liberal theory in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis was a front running factor shaping 
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the political economy of the Turkey and inevitably the JDP government. This chapter 
focuses on this changing nature of the institutional framework.  
 
 
4.1. The Making of the New Institutional Framework 
 
The most influential factor contributing to the making of the new institutional framework 
was the IMF conditionality. The 2001 crisis was once again the key to initiate the 
process. Both foreign and domestic private investors completely lost their confidence in 
the Turkish economy in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. As outlined earlier in the 
second chapter, billions of dollars worth of portfolio investment left the country in matter 
of days. The economy promptly needed large amounts of foreign exchange in order to 
stabilize the major macroeconomic indicators such as the interest rates and exchange 
rates.  
 
In the midst of such a large-scale financial crisis, IMF loans emerged as the primary 
source of finance. The Fund releases a portion of its credit assistance if the country meets 
the requirements of the IMF program. In order to review the performance of the debtor 
country periodic meetings are held by country and IMF officials. Hence the IMF earned 
an important bargaining position to impose its conditionality in the bilateral relations. 
With the influence of the IMF conditionality reaching an all time high, the neo-
liberalization in its true essence has finally started to shape the institutional infrastructure 
in Turkey. As Cizre and Yeldan (2005: 403) articulate:  
 47 
What loan conditionality seeks to do is to set in motion the forces of the free-
market by reducing the economic resources flowing through the public sector. As 
a result, the scope of political patronage available to the power wielders in the 
Turkish political system is curtailed.  
 
Therefore, the roles of the politics and the state over the economics have noticeably 
shifted towards a more neo-liberal nature with the post-2001 crisis reform process.  
 
There were three other factors further contributing to the making of the new framework. 
First, not only the influence of the IMF conditionality has increased but also the nature of 
the conditionality has evolved. After the 1997 Asian crisis, IMF started to embrace the 
emerging Post-Washington Consensus (PWC). The long lasting criticisms of the 
Washington Consensus led the emergence of the PWC. In essence, PWC transformed the 
pure neo-liberal goal of minimizing the role of state into granting a more central role to 
the state institutions.32 Consequently the IMF adopted a fresh line of thinking and the 
scheme of its assistance programs had altered. As Onis and Senses (2005: 13) argue “the 
institution now tends to pay far more attention to regulatory reforms, notably in the 
context of the banking and financial system, and recognizes far more than in the past the 
importance of strong institutions and ‘good governance’”.  
 
Second, the harmonization efforts with the acquis communautaire were influential in the 
making of the new institutional framework. The EU accession process not only requires 
passing of numerous new laws in line with the acquis communautaire but also successful 
implementation of these new laws. Annual progress reports, which are prepared by the 
European Commission to analyze Turkey’s progress in harmonizing its institutional 
                                                 
32
 See: (Stiglitz, 1999). 
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framework with the acquis communautaire, serve strong monitoring function for the 
reform process. The public procurement law is a perfect example of the EU influence. In 
2002 the new law was introduced and the annual progress report praised the new public 
procurement law for its success in aligning the Turkish laws with the acquis 
communautaire.33 However, in the 2003 progress report the reversal of the previous 
success in aligning the public procurement law was immediately identified and Turkish 
authorities were notified.34 In other words, the EU effectively contributes to the making 
of the reforms and monitoring of their successful implementation.  
 
It is also worth noting that the IMF conditionality was still more effective than the 
harmonization with the acquis communautaire in the making of post-2001 institutional 
framework. As Eder (2003: 230-233) points out the EU changed its grand economic 
theory from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism and thus the Copenhagen economic criteria 
became very much in line with the classical IMF conditionality. Therefore, especially in 
the economic reforms the IMF conditionality emerged as the primary external anchor 
since the EU economic conditionality suffers from a time lag. While the EU offers long-
term positive returns it asks for short-term policy implementations without providing any 
significant material incentive at the time of implementation. Yet, aside from the 
economic reforms in the political and social realms that IMF does not assume any role 
the EU was the single most influential anchor guiding the new institutional framework. 
 
                                                 
33
 See: (European Commission, 2002: 66). 
 
34
 See: (European Commission, 2003: 64). 
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Third, the pro-reform coalition gained ground with the destructive effects of the 2001 
crisis. Over the years bureaucrats prepared many blueprints for the restructuring of the 
institutional framework. However, prior to the 2001 crisis the political will was lacking to 
turn those blueprints into tangible structural reforms as Dervis, Asker and Cetin (2006: 
71) point out. The strengthening hand of the pro-reform coalition urged the politicians to 
implement the much-needed structural reforms. With all these three factors at play, a new 
institutional setting has come to exist.  
 
 
4.2. Main Components of the New Institutional Framework 
 
The new institutional framework has reorganized the structure of the state mainly in order 
to achieve two goals. First goal was to improve the balance of the budget by making the 
public spending more efficient. Due to the shortsighted populist policies, the resources of 
state had long been recklessly spent. The public spending was not transparent, and 
accountability was largely lacking. Most visibly the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 
in general and the public banks in particular recorded large amounts of losses in 
consistent terms. Thus a set of structural reforms was made specifically to address these 
problems.  
 
The other goal was to give the state a more complementary role within the economics. 
Prior to the 2001 crisis, the rent distributing capacity of the state was one of the primary 
sources of economic activity. The politics and economics were interrelated in such a 
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manner that the politicians and businessmen derived joint rents. This twisted political 
economic structure needed a restructuring in accordance with the neo-liberal theory. 
Hence a competition state, which serves strict regulatory role, has emerged with the 
structural reforms of post 2001 era.   
 
In order to achieve these two aforementioned goals many reforms were made which all 
are listed in the table below. 
 
Table 10  
 
 
Key 
Structural 
Reforms 
Constituting 
the New 
Institutional 
Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Improving the transparency and accountability of the budgetary process 
• Strengthening the autonomy of the Central Bank through legal protection  
• Enhancing the autonomy of the BRSA, much tighter regulation of the banking and 
financial system with a special emphasis on the public banks 
• Strengthening the position of autonomous regulatory agencies in several areas of the 
economy including energy (oil and natural gas) and telecommunications  
• Increasing the transparency in the process involving the sale of public assets 
• Establishing a new independent regulatory board on the public procurements 
• Removing the state monopolies in electricity, sugar and tobacco production  
• Reducing the corporate tax rate  
• Reducing the administrative barriers to FDI  
• Reducing the agricultural subsidies via the new direct income support mechanism 
• Revitalizing the privatization program  
Adopted from (Onis, 2006a). 
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4.3. Implications of the New Institutional Framework 
 
There have been a number of developments brought by the new institutional framework 
which all contributed to the unorthodox political economy agenda of the JDP. First, the 
role of state within the economics had changed and ultimately reduced. With the 
powerful effects of the emerging PWC within the IMF, the Fund demanded strong 
institutions performing impartial regulatory function. Consequently many independent 
regulatory agencies were either established or reinvigorated. Thus a transfer of power 
from political institutions to the technocratic agencies occurred. The significance of this 
shift of power lies in the history of the Turkish political economy. The political parties 
have long used the political institutions in Turkey for distributing economic rents. 
Technocrats, on the other hand, do not act with political considerations because they do 
not have an ambition to be re-elected to their posts. Hence they are capable of achieving a 
stable course of policy that solely aims to bring the best possible outcomes both for the 
state and the economy. With the transfer of rent distributing capabilities of the state to the 
independent regulatory institutions, the populist patronage politics were curtailed. 
Consequently the JDP compared to the previous governments had lesser room to engage 
in populism and distribute rents to a selected businessmen or social groups. 
 
The quick pick-up in the privatization sales is a perfect example to outline this new 
institutional framework and its reflections upon the political economy. Since the two 
main purposes of the making the new institutional framework were cutting off the 
sources of rent-distributing capabilities of the states and reducing the excessive and 
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reckless public spending, privatization became a front-running priority addressing both of 
these goals. The politicians had long considered the SEEs as an infinite source of 
employment regardless of the negative financial consequences attached to this populist 
approach. Thus over the years most of the SEEs brought sizeable burdens to the budget.  
 
Various reforms were made in order to set in motion the privatization process. First, the 
sale of the public assets was made more transparent. Some major privatization sales even 
broadcasted live on national television channels. This reform eased the skepticism of the 
public and the business circles over the lack fair competition in the privatization 
process.35 Moreover, equal footing for the FDI was granted in order to attract the interest 
of foreign investors and encourage them to participate in the privatization sales. The 
reduction of the corporate tax rate from 30 percent to 20 percent has been a final 
incentive for the investors. The rapid growth, positive outlook of the Turkish economy in 
the post-2001 era and the beginning of the EU negotiations boosted the investor 
confidence and a privatization boom followed. 
 
Table 11 
Yearly (million $) 
1985-
2002 
average 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Privatization Revenues 444 187 1,283 8,222 8,096 
Source: Privatization Agency 
 
                                                 
35
 For a comprehensive analysis of the barriers to the privatization in Turkey see: (Ercan and Onis, 2001).  
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The privatization sales provided significant amounts of resource to improve the revenue 
side of the budget. But more importantly the sales of constantly loss-recording SEEs cut 
back the inefficient public spending. A major avenue of populism was blocked. With the 
swift privatization sales, the budget relieved from a major source of deficit. The 
privatized enterprises turned into profit-making facilities in the hands of private sector 
contributing to the economy.   
 
Also similar to the reforms making the privatization more transparent, the public 
procurement procedure was reorganized. The public procurements have long been 
speculated as a major source of patronage politics. Allegedly the political parties favored 
their political constituencies in the procurement procedures. Therefore, the required fair 
competition could not be attained. The state was forced to overpay for many public 
procurements. The foundation of the new independent Public Procurement Agency 
reduced the involvement of the politicians within the procurement process. Transferring 
the task of implementing the public procurements blocked another possible avenue for 
the politicians to engage in populist patronage policies.    
 
The autonomy of CBT is also a crucial development. Prior to the 2001 crisis the CBT 
was heavily influenced by the political pressures and thus was not able to successfully 
execute its primary task of providing the price stability. The politicians had the room to 
overuse the sources of the state and then force the CBT to increase the money supply and 
the interest rates to cover up the budget deficit. This in turn heavily contributed to the 
chronic inflation that the Turkish economy suffered for decades. The new independent 
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CBT has the capability to block the political pressures, and to successfully maintain the 
price stability. Consequently politicians have lesser room to abuse the resources of the 
state. 
 
One other structural reform contributing to the fiscal discipline is the reorganization of 
the budgetary process. Prior to the 2001 there were approximately 70 independent state 
funds each making non-accountable public spending. Most of these funds were shut 
down and consequently the public spending became more transparent and accountable. 
The transparent budget also helped the IMF to more accurately monitor the fiscal 
discipline. Given the increasing role of the IMF in the post-2001 recovery process, under 
these new circumstances the government had little maneuvering space, either to use the 
budgetary funds for populist purposes or to loosen up fiscal discipline.  
 
Along with the reforms bringing the agricultural subsidy reduction and tighter 
supervision over the public banks, the new institutional framework managed to 
significantly decrease the inefficient public spending. With the declining public spending 
inevitably the populist use of state resources has diminished. But most important of all, 
independent regulatory agencies gained strength. The technocrats in these agencies 
provided a shield against abuse of the political interest. Consequently on the macro level 
the ways that the political parties may engage in patronage policies to harvest political 
gains are significantly reduced. With the help of superior monitoring abilities of the IMF 
the public spending has become much more efficient. Hence in the presence of the new 
institutional framework, JDP as the political party in office had lesser room to engage in 
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classical populist policy practices and abundantly use the resources of the state to derive 
political gains.  
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CHAPTER 5 
  
THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE NETWORKS SHAPING THE 
TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 
As it was outlined in the second chapter of the thesis, politics in pre-2001 crisis Turkish 
economy was the main source of the economic activity. Within the deeply divided 
political system, parties sought to provide material incentives to certain distributive 
coalitions and social groups. With the 2002 general election this era of Turkish political 
economy has come to a close. “All the political parties representing the old, statist, 
clientalist, corruption-producing and crisis-ridden Turkey have been penalized very 
strongly by the Turkish electorate.” (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005: 124)  
 
The purge of the political parties and their mentalities brought about the onset of a new 
era in the Turkish politics. As a drastic change was taking place in the political realm, the 
old networks connecting the economics with the politics fundamentally changed. 
Consequently the balance of power within the system was reorganized in favor of the 
domestic pro-reform coalition and the external anchors. This new power structure is one 
of the main reasons behind the extraordinary chapter of the Turkish political economy 
under the JDP rule.  
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5.1. The Roots of the Change 
 
One can trace the roots of the drastic post-2001 era political change in the economic 
realm. The dismal performance of the Turkish economy especially after the end of the 
first Ozal government in 1987 put the country into position of an underachiever. The 
economic growth simply could not live up to its potential. Inadequate governance of the 
politics and economics cost the Turkish people dearly with the recurring financial crises 
and chronic political instabilities. Thus, the disillusioned electorate elected none of the 
governments after 1987 for two consecutive terms. The 2001 crisis was the final straw 
with its destructive economic consequences. A total re-structuring of the political scene 
became inevitable. 
 
Along with the political and economic problems, the 1990s also witnessed the rise of 
“economic” Islam. While political Islam is a much popular and commonly used 
phenomenon, the economic Islam lately started to attract some academic interest.36 The 
economic Islam established its representative organization MUSIAD in 1990.   
The qualification of the MUSIAD as ‘Islamic’ is due to the fact that it has close 
ties with political Islam mainly represented in Turkey since the 1980s by the 
Welfare Party, then the Virtue Party and finally the Justice and Development 
Party. (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005: 112)  
 
                                                 
36
 See: (Bugra, 1999: 9). 
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On the other hand, the parties associated with Islam have been on the political scene since 
the 1970s. The JDP has genetic ties with the political Islam even though the Party 
considers itself as a central right party with conservative tendencies. 
 
The time lag between the institutionalizations of political and economic Islam can be 
attributed to the late blooming of the Islamic capital. Before the onset of economic 
liberalization in 1980, capital was divided between state and a limited number of 
domestic business conglomerates located in Istanbul. With the increasing economic 
activity of the relatively more liberal era, previously insignificant eastern and central 
Anatolian towns started to produce new businesses at various sizes.37 In 1993, 188 
enterprises, which were not located in Istanbul, entered to the top 500 industrial 
enterprises list. Among the top 100, only 24 enterprises located in Anatolia made it to the 
list. In following years these numbers gradually increased and in 2006 reached 
respectively to 267 and 34.38 Within the more conservative texture of these regions these 
emerging economic actors relied upon Islam as a basis of trust to organize their economic 
lives.39 The growing influence and power of the Islamic capital and MUSIAD, 
representing the SMEs that are mostly affiliated with Islamist inclinations, has been a key 
factor behind the rise of political Islam from 1991 general election onwards. 
 
                                                 
 
37
 See: (Bugra, 1999: 14-15). 
 
38
 These figures are obtained from (Istanbul Chamber of Industry, 2006). 
 
39See: (Bugra, 1999: 13).  
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After the February 28 process the reformist wing of the rising political Islam favored a 
discourse much closer to the central political parties.40 This new moderate version of 
political Islam appealed not only the growing Islamic capital but also it emerged as a 
clean and untested option for the disillusioned Turkish electorate especially after the 2001 
crisis. All these factors pushed the JDP to the top of the political system, which left all 
the traditional political parties out of the parliament except for the Republican People’s 
Party (RPP).41 This new political picture and the expectations of the Turkish people 
desperately seeking the political party that is capable of providing stability in the political 
and economic realms urged the JDP to implement an unconventional political economy.    
 
 
5.2. The New Political Economic Balance of Power 
 
The domestic political authority was the centerpiece of the old Turkish political 
economy. Other actors both domestic and external had limited power within the system. 
The very depth of the 2001 crisis combined with the aforementioned factors such as the 
rise of political Islam and the balance of power of the political economic system had 
fundamentally altered. The domestic political authority transferred much of its power to 
other actors.  
 
                                                 
 
40
 See: (Mecham, 2004). 
 
41
 For more on the 2001 elections see: (Ozel, 2003), (Onis and Keyman, 2003). 
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The first major recipient of the transferred power is the domestic pro-reform coalition. 
The mindset of the politicians and bureaucrats changed. Previously they were primarily 
seeking to maintain the old system. The powerful 2001 crisis proved the old ways to be 
unsustainable. Years of chronic economic and political problems could only be ended 
with drastic reforms. The growing public awareness of this very fact provided the ground 
for the reform process to take off. Against this broad consensus the domestic actors that 
sought to keep the old system running and quite possibly derive benefits from the 
maintenance of the status quo lost their power to resist the change.  
 
As a direct result of the domestic pro-reform coalition’s stronger status, independent 
regulatory agencies within the state run by the technocrats enjoyed greater degrees of 
power. Both IMF and Dervis placed utmost importance to the role of the independent 
agencies and JDP maintained the same tendency. These agencies are especially important 
as they strongly supported and contributed to the post-2001 crisis reform process 
especially on the sensitive issue arenas such as the privatization and banking sector.   
 
Privatization sets a clear example for the increasing power of the domestic pro-reform 
coalition. Since Turkish liberalization initiative had begun, most of the central political 
parties declared privatization as an important element of their political program.42 
However, when these parties took office they did not implement privatization partly 
because they did not have the sufficient political power within the deeply divided 
parliamentary setting but more importantly because they would be losing a major source 
of political rent distributing capability. The intrastate bureaucracy was another major 
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 See: (Ercan and Onis, 2001: 121). 
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source of resistance in front of the privatization. Bureaucrats running the state enterprises 
enjoyed great degrees of power and influence due to their posts and thus do not favor the 
privatization of these enterprises. The labor unions also opposed the privatization as the 
private sector would look for laying off the abundant labor employed in the privatized 
SEEs.43   
 
It was only after the 2001 crisis that these status-quo seeking actors were put in a position 
where they were unable to raise their voice against the privatization process mainly 
because the country was experiencing severe financial difficulties. Under these difficult 
conditions privatization offered a possible source of relief, which was already overly 
postponed. One other factor easing the JDP’s way in privatization was the IMF 
conditionality and EU’s eager anticipation. As it was pointed out earlier, the IMF was in 
a commanding position in the post-2001 era and its conditionality had the utmost 
enforcing capability over the JDP government. Also as a leading actor of post-2001 era 
the EU effectively pushed for successful privatization. All in all the pro-reform coalition 
was able to make the necessary reforms to revitalize the privatization program and ease 
the difficulties facing investors. With all these factors at play the Privatization 
Administration managed to execute its portfolio in a quick and effective fashion. 
 
Having pointed out the role of IMF, the other major recipient of the power of the state is 
the external actors and their role within the new balance of power deserves elaboration. 
As it was highlighted in the previous chapters, the EU and IMF became two powerful 
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anchors in the post 2001 context. These anchors provided valuable blueprints for the set 
of reforms that are needed to be implemented. Moreover they also encouraged the 
Turkish government to act within certain deadlines, which further contributed to the 
making and speeding up of the reform process. As Onis and Bakir (2007: 3) put it: 
External anchors, such as the IMF or EU can help domestic policy-makers to 
override strong resistance on the part of domestic interest groups. A good 
example would be the resistance of domestic banking lobbies against reform 
involving tighter regulation of the banking and the financial system.  
 
Indeed the reform process reshaping the finance and banking sectors is a perfect example 
of how the domestic pro-reform coalition and external actors gained upper hand and thus 
reflected their influence over a prolonged economic problem. The voice of domestic pro-
reform coalition, Dervis, and the IMF and EU as powerful external anchors identified the 
banking sector as a priority in the reform efforts. As it was outlined in the second chapter, 
the inadequate regulation of the finance sector was a major source of economic 
imbalance ever since the full convertibility of the TL was established. While making 
sizeable profits, Turkish banks took high levels of risks and ignored their primary duty of 
lending money to the real economy.  
 
Although there was a growing consensus on the need for better regulation of the banking 
sector, the powerful banking lobby managed to postpone these reform efforts.44 When the 
2001 crisis reset the balance of power in the Turkish political economy and tarnished the 
old networks that provided the powerful position for the banking sector lobby against the 
political authority, the reforms providing tighter and more competent regulation of the 
banking sector started to take place in a rapid fashion.     
                                                 
44
 See: (Onis, 2006a: 7, 16, 27), (Akyurek, 2006: 26). 
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The banking sector reform also signifies the decreasing role of the specific distributive 
coalitions and social groups over the political authority. The small distributive coalitions 
such as the banking lobby lost their influence over the political establishment simply 
because the other side of the networks connecting these small distributive coalitions to 
the political authority was totally changed. The reforms on the banking sector after the 
2001 crisis clearly indicates that first the coalition government under the guidance of 
Kemal Dervis and then the JDP government prioritized the interest of the whole economy 
before the interest of these small coalitions. 
 
The reforms on the banking sector after the 2001 crisis also indicate the weakening status 
of the individual social groups. MUSIAD is the representative organization of the SMEs 
that constituted the foundation of the JDP’s electoral base. However, this social group 
strongly opposed the tighter regulation of the finance sector. The risk factor associated 
with lending to a SME is quite high. Therefore the SMEs, in general, are not able to find 
credits as easily as the big business.45 Without the sufficient levels of credit supply, the 
SMEs cannot enlarge their business or even they might struggle to keep their business 
running. Therefore, a tighter regulation and close supervision of the finance sector meant 
lesser credit availability for the SMEs. Yet, the government acted in accordance with the 
expectations of the broader consensus including the market, IMF and big business by 
implementing the reforms bringing tighter regulations over the banking sector.  
 
                                                 
45
 See: (Bugra, 1999: 31). 
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Turning back to the growing influence of the external actors, not only the international 
institutions such as the IMF and EU but also the private external actors earned a more 
central role. The penetration of these private actors to the Turkish economy via mergers 
and acquisitions has significantly increased in the post-2001 era. The banking sector 
reflects this increasing rate of foreign penetration quite clearly. In 2005 and 2006 alone, 
the foreign banks bought shares of 14 different Turkish banks. As of 2007, the total of 
foreign assets reached 42 percent of the entire Turkish banking sector.46 Hence private 
external actors inevitably gained power and influence with their increasing volume of 
investments.  
 
The same trend can be observed in the increasing influence of the private sector in 
general. With rapid privatization is underway, the presence of SEEs declined gradually 
and private sector occupied a more central role within the economics. In 1994, 71 SEEs 
entered the list of top 500 industrial enterprises while 18 SEEs made it to the top 100 list. 
Especially after the breakthrough of the privatization in 2000s, the number of SEEs 
entering the top industrial enterprises list declined sharply. In 2006, only 9 SEEs entered 
top 100 list while an overall 13 SEEs were ranked among the top 500 industrial 
enterprises. With private sector replacing the role of SEEs, the domestic competition 
climate affected positively but even more importantly the shrinking presence of state 
means lesser available avenues for populist policy practices.  
 
 
                                                 
 
46
 See: (NTVMSNBC, 2007a). 
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5.3. The JDP within the New Political Economic Networks  
 
The new balance of power in the Turkish political economy both pushed the JDP to 
implement the reforms and stick to the fiscal discipline and it also helped to achieve these 
goals. First, the declining role of social groups over the economics has been a great 
opportunity for the JDP in keeping the reform process and fiscal discipline on track. Prior 
to the 2001 crisis each social group from urban workers to farmers and SMEs supported a 
certain political party.47 These parties were mostly able to pass the 10 percent electoral 
threshold but were unable to receive sufficient levels of votes to form a single party 
government. Thus many coalition governments were established with the participation of 
multiple political parties, which all prioritized the interest of a certain social group.  
 
The 2002 elections witnessed a novel phenomenon. With the powerful effects of 2001 
crisis creating discomfort for every social group, the interest of whole country was started 
to put in front of the interest of the individual social groups. The main concern of the 
electorate was to shake off the devastating effects of the crisis as quickly as possible. 
Thus the electorate did not vote the political parties that were historically associated with 
certain social groups. Instead the votes were accumulated in two parties, which were not 
associated with the crisis. With only two political parties earning seats in the parliament, 
each social group did not have a specific political party that primarily aims to protect the 
interest of the social group. Consequently, this new setting of the parliament notably 
decreased the influence of the individual social groups over the politics.  
                                                 
47
 For a detailed list of political parties associated with certain social groups see: (Eder, 2003: 225). 
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The SMEs could be identified as the bulk of JDP’s electoral support. Also due to its 
genetic ties with political Islam, the core supporters of JDP may be termed as being 
expectant of the extension of the religious rights and freedoms. Yet, the JDP government 
was able to overlook the individual expectations of both SMEs and Islamists in the wake 
of the destructive 2001 crisis. Being aware of the fact that the front-running expectation 
of the people was to recover rapidly from the crisis, the JDP pursued a political agenda 
that aims to address the expectations of the general public rather than individual social 
groups. The reflection of this new order of priority can be found in the long-lasting 
reform process and fiscal discipline that the JDP managed to keep for an unusually long 
period of time. 
 
Second, apart from the social groups the declining power of the small distributive 
coalitions and their lobbies also provided a major source of relief to the JDP government 
in keeping the fiscal discipline and reform process alive. If, for example, the banking 
lobby had re-asserted its power over the political authority, the JDP might not have been 
able to implement the reforms bringing tighter regulation and supervision of the finance 
sector. Or the pressures of the exporters to decrease the real interest rates in order to 
devaluate the TL could result in damaging the autonomy of the CBT, loosening up of the 
fiscal and monetary discipline and consequently price stabilization might not be 
maintained for four and a half years.  
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The increasing role of the external actors especially the strengthening position of IMF has 
been a major contributor to the reform process and the fiscal discipline. The JDP utilized 
the IMF conditionality and supervision to its fullest extent. One of the main arguments in 
overcoming the resistance of the anti-reform coalition was that the Fund conditionality 
requires the reforms and fiscal discipline. Failing to implement these conditions may very 
well lead to the breakdown of the IMF cooperation. After the 2001 crisis the cooperation 
and support of the IMF could not be jeopardized, as the newly established trust 
environment would be seriously damaged. 
 
The political economy of the new era focuses on the big picture represented by the 
macroeconomic figures. Being aware of this fact the JDP aimed to achieve political and 
economic stability by meeting the expectations of the public, markets and external actors. 
While achieving the stability the decreasing influence of the social groups such as the 
SMEs, farmers and urban workers, small distributive coalitions and the increasing power 
of the domestic pro-reform-coalition and external anchors provided the opportunity space 
for JDP to execute the IMF conditionality and resume the structural reform process. This 
new balance of power in the Turkish political economy is one of the main contributors of 
the JDP’s unorthodox political economy.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE ROLE OF JDP IN POST-2001 CRISIS RESTRUCTURING OF 
TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
 
Up to this point the thesis provided three sets of explanations for the unusual course of 
Turkish political economy in the post-2001 crisis era. All of these explanations are based 
on developments that took place without JDP playing an active role. In other words, the 
JDP may seem to be acting with the flow and solely confirming to the parameters set by 
the new political environment after the 2001 crisis. However, in order to fully capture the 
making of the new chapter of Turkish political economy one has to acknowledge the 
direct contributions of the political party that was in office for four and a half years as a 
single party government. So it is impossible to deny the fact that the JDP government 
itself is part of the explanation for the long lasting fiscal discipline and reform process.  
 
Without the determination and prudent political economic agenda of the JDP, the five-
year period following the 2001 crisis would be a profoundly different one. No matter how 
the conditions positively constrained the JDP’s political economic agenda and provided 
favorable environment, still “the JDP government has displayed a far greater degree of 
commitment to fiscal discipline and EU related political reforms than any other Turkish 
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political party to date.” (Onis, 2006a: 12) Also it is important to note that for the first 
time ever in Turkish history an IMF program was successfully implemented to the end, 
and then renewed in the absence of any major financial urgency. While realizing the 
central role of favorable conditions, one should not overlook the successful utilization of 
those favorable conditions by the JDP leadership.   
 
 
6.1. Using the Advantages of Single Party Government 
 
Being a single party government brought both enormous opportunity and responsibility to 
the government. To its credit, JDP followed a careful political agenda matching well to 
the responsibility weighing on its shoulders. “Even with the best efforts of the economic 
officials in Turkey and the Fund, political uncertainty could undermine policy efforts.” 
(IMF, 2002: 15) The lack of cohesion is a vital threat to the credibility and sustainability 
of the economic program. The example of previous coalition government proves the 
point of IMF. Although under the guidance of Kemal Dervis the previous coalition 
government started the economic recovery and restructuring efforts, the members of 
cabinet had two public confrontations that had the potential to seriously jeopardize the 
success of the economic recovery process.  
 
First, the minister responsible for privatization and MP deputy Yuksel Yalova, publicly 
opposed the proposed Tobacco law. Since Kemal Dervis considered this new law as a 
major fold of the structural reform process, the contradicting views of the ministers 
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immediately reversed the market sentiment and TL depreciated while the stock market 
fell abruptly. In a similar incident, minister of transport and NMP deputy Enis Oksuz and 
Kemal Dervis did not agree on the appointment of a member of the Executive Board of 
the Turkish Telecom. Oksuz did not compromise on the appointment issue and then 
publicly criticized the privatization of the Turkish Telecom, which was a front-running 
priority in the economic program. In both incidents the ministers who challenged Dervis 
and the program were forced to resign. But more importantly the contradictions they 
created regarding the credibility of the program and the economy in general caused 
sizeable turbulences that had the potential to ruin the entire trust building efforts of the 
Turkish economy after the 2001 crisis.  
 
The JDP, on the other hand, successfully used the advantage of being a single party 
government and showed the sufficient unity and harmony to avoid such encounters 
within the cabinet. Moreover, as pointed in previous chapters the government did not 
force controversial issues such as the Higher Education bill. This bill could have provided 
a great concession to the Islamists that are believed to be a founding stone of the JDP’s 
electoral base but at the same time it could have created political tension within the 
Islamist-secularist axis. Such a political tension might very well lead to the break down 
of the IMF-induced economic program and seriously jeopardize the recovery process. As 
the single party government, JDP had the power to force the issue and re-send the bill to 
the President for the second time. However, JDP did not abuse its power of being a single 
party government and acted responsibly by sidelining the issue. JDP’s conscious effort to 
avoid any political tension by considering the sensitivities of the other political actors 
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proves the party’s success in responsibly using the power of being a single party 
government.48 
 
 
6.2. Using the Advantages of the Growing World Economy 
 
The world economy as a whole experienced a rapid growth period when the Turkish 
economy recorded its impressive run after 2002. Thus one can argue that the positive 
world economic outlook rather than the policy implementations of the JDP government is 
largely responsible for this recent economic success. 
 
Table 12 
GDP Growth (annual) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Middle Income Countries 3.7 5.2 7.4 6.5 7.2 
World Average 1.8 2.8 4.1 3.5 4.0 
Turkey 7.9 5.8 8.9 7.4 6.1 
Source: World Development Indicators Database, World Bank. 
 
Looking at the table 12 above, it is a fact that the world economy enjoyed a positive 
outlook in 2002-2006 period. However, Turkey still managed to outperform its middle-
income peers each year except for 2006. The world economy surely experienced other 
rapid growth periods before but Turkey never utilized these periods so efficiently. 
Between years 1996 and 2000 the world economy averaged a higher growth rate with 
3.35 percent than the 3.24 percent in 2002-2006 period. Yet the average growth rate of 
                                                 
48
 For another example of JDP’s careful policy implementation to avoid tension on the politically sensitive 
issue of headscarf see: (Tepe, 2005: 78-79). 
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the Turkish economy in 1996-2000 period was 4.06 percent which is nearly half of the 
2002-2006 average. So it is clear then that the JDP government effectively utilized the 
strong growth period in the world economy.  
 
But perhaps it is even more important to note that the Turkish economy managed to grow 
consistently at these high rates. No matter how much the world economy contributed to 
this process, a constant growth pattern that lasts for over twenty consecutive quarters is a 
record for the post-1980 Turkish economy. It is imperative to know that in Turkish 
context any domestic political crisis or failure to meet the expectations of the market in 
the economic front could have easily upset the long-lasting growth pattern. Hence the 
JDP government deserves credit for successfully utilizing an advantageous era and 
making good use of the opportunity by avoiding any political crises or letdown of the 
market expectations.  
 
 
6.3. JDP as a New Type of Coalition 
 
The JDP was given the chance of forming a single party government by the Turkish 
electorate after 15 years of coalition governments. As pointed out in the previous chapters 
prior to the 2002 elections each social group supported a specific political party and these 
parties were able to earn seats in the parliament but unable to form government single-
handedly. Thus for 15 years many coalition governments were formed by political parties 
aiming to address the expectations of single social groups. In the 2002 elections these 
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parties were left out of the parliament. The purge of the classic political parties such as 
MP or True Path Party (TPP) associated with different segments of the society and 
significant amount of votes that the JDP received indicated the fact that the electoral base 
of JDP was a combination of multiple social groups. In other words, this time the 
coalition was not made in the parliament but in the election.  
 
“The party has been extremely successful in constituting a cross-class electoral alliance 
incorporating into its orbit both winners and losers from the neo-liberal globalization 
process.”(Onis, 2006b: 1) This broad and diverse electoral support meant that the JDP 
needed to pursue the interest of the whole. The JDP could not single out a social group 
and favor its interest. The only way to satisfy the broad and diverse electoral base was to 
provide an overall improvement in terms of macroeconomic figures.  
 
The JDP also realized the fact that rapid economic growth would enable the party to 
enlarge its electoral base. The big business and its representative organization TUSIAD, 
for example, historically distanced itself from political Islam and strongly advertised the 
importance of the secular, democratic and liberal structure of the state. “The main lesson 
that the JDP learned from the record of its predecessors involved the need to construct a 
broad based interclass alliance.”(Onis, 2006b: 6) Hence adding the big business to its 
electoral base emerged as a policy priority of the JDP. In order to appeal the big business, 
JDP showed a stance closer to the TUSIAD rather than the core of its electoral base 
MUSIAD. The high level of commitment to the IMF cooperation and the genuine efforts 
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to achieve the ultimate goal of EU membership are policy implementations which all 
signify a more of a TUSIAD-like approach.   
 
The inclination of JDP’s political economy towards TUSIAD deserves elaboration, as 
there are significant points of divergence between the MUSIAD and TUSIAD. MUSIAD 
questions the content of IMF programs and promotes the idea that the government should 
effectively bargain with the Fund before implementing these programs. Moreover, 
MUSIAD seeks to adopt an independent economic program as soon as possible and end 
the IMF cooperation. TUSIAD, on the other, hand believes in the guidance of the IMF 
and does not have any reservations about the nature of the programs, which it hopes to be 
kept renewed. The divergences are crystal clear especially on the issues of regulation of 
financial sector, tight budgetary discipline and formation of the autonomous regulatory 
institutions.  
 
Table 13 
 
                          MUSIAD  TUSIAD  
Budgetary 
Discipline 
Accepts that the government has 
been successful in imposing fiscal 
discipline but also draws attention to 
some of the costs of excessive 
budgetary discipline, notably in the 
sphere of public investments. 
Highly supportive of the 
Government’s budgetary stance and 
commitment to fiscal discipline. 
Financial 
Sector 
Regulation and 
the Real 
Economy 
Financial sector regulation should be 
in line with the needs of the real 
economy. Single minded focus on 
tight banking sector regulation is 
costly in terms of growth and 
performance of the real economy. 
Tight regulation of the financial 
sector is crucial. Weak regulations 
may create the basis of yet another 
financial crisis. 
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Regulatory 
Institutions in 
Action  
Critical of such institutions. These 
institutions should be more 
accountable for them to be able to 
adopt a balanced approach to 
regulation.  
In line with the IMF, firm belief that 
for tight and effective regulation, 
these institutions should be highly 
autonomous. Not much emphasis on 
accountability.  
   Source: Onis 2006b: 22.  
 
JDP’s stance, which is much closer to the TUSIAD than the MUSAID, could be 
attributed to a window of opportunity that the party had prudently identified.  
 
 
6.4. The Window of Opportunity 
 
Political parties in Turkey generally lose electoral popularity when they are part of the 
government as the country suffered long years of inadequate governance. The electorate 
was often disappointed with performance of the governments and sought for previously 
untested options in the next elections. However, the combination of various structural 
developments provided a window of opportunity for JDP to enlarge its electoral base 
while the party was in office. To its credit JDP successfully shaped its political economy 
in order to utilize this chance. 
 
After the powerful 2001 crisis, the whole country was primarily seeking quick recovery 
and then stability. The previous coalition government had already achieved a decent 
recovery and provided the road map for the next government. Strictly following the IMF-
induced economic program and making the necessary reforms for the EU membership 
could have turned the recovery process into a success story in the long run. JDP used this 
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recipe even though the SMEs were unhappy with the tight fiscal policies and IMF 
engagement.  
 
The wisdom here lies in the idea that a rapid economic growth environment would 
generate positive effects, which ultimately trickle down to every segment of the economy 
including the SMEs. Normally there is a trade off between meeting the demands of the 
SMEs and big business. For example, the SMEs seek for expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies in order to enlarge their businesses. Big business, on the other, hand 
prioritizes stability to secure its costly investments. A stable and high level of economic 
growth would please both the SMEs and big business. Indeed the Turkish economy 
recorded growth for twenty consecutive quarters as of 2006. Although the JDP 
government chose the path that IMF and big business promotes, the end result pleased the 
entire economic segments including the SMEs.  Thus JDP managed to keep the core of its 
electoral base happy while adding the big business to its electoral base.  
 
The dismal performances of the previous governments provided yet another opportunity 
for the JDP. In relative terms, avoiding any major political or financial crisis would be a 
success. Decreasing the inflation rate and providing stable growth would be stellar 
achievements for the underachiever Turkey. The chronic inflation problem, for example, 
could simply be dealt with by fiscal discipline and determination, which supposedly all 
governments should provide, and yet never delivered for decades. Simply executing its 
occupational duties was enough for JDP to be successful. 
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All in all, JDP made a correct analysis of the conditions at hand and established its 
political economy accordingly. However, there is an important difference between theory 
and practice. Almost every political party in Turkey had excellent solutions to Turkey’s 
problems, which were never successfully applied. What separates JDP from previous 
governments is its successful execution of the political economy agenda, which has been 
an important part of the Turkey’s economic success in post-2001 crisis era.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The 2001 financial crisis is a major turning point for Turkey. By all means the economy 
hit rock bottom and drastic changes in both economic and political realms became 
inevitable. This thesis aimed to shed light on this era by elaborating upon the making of 
this new, post-2001 episode of the Turkish political economy. The most striking element 
of post-2001 restructuring of Turkey has been the long-lasting fiscal discipline and 
structural reforms which both are uncommon considering the past record of the Turkish 
political economy. This thesis provides four different explanations for these novel 
phenomena. 
 
First, the growing ties with the global economy have been instrumental in the making of 
the post-2001 crisis Turkish political economy. Turkey has been an active participant of 
the financial globalization after the capital account liberalization in 1989. Thus the global 
economic trends strongly affected the Turkish economy. In the post-2001 political 
economic restructuring this effect of global economy over Turkey reached new heights. 
The rapid and high level of growth brought widening current account and foreign trade 
deficits. Having been attracted by the high real interest rates that are offered in Turkey, 
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global financial actors drastically increased their short-term portfolio investments in 
Turkey. These investments of global economic actors covered the foreign trade and 
current account deficits. In other words, the post-2001 growth was mainly financed by 
the global liquidity. In this new setting the efforts to secure the inflow of this global 
liquidity have been a primary anchor for Turkey under the JDP. Hence, the long-lasting 
fiscal discipline and the ongoing reform process can be attributed to the heavy need of 
Turkish economy to the foreign exchange supply.  
 
Second, the new institutional framework made quite an impact on the JDP-era Turkish 
political economy. Previously the state had accumulated all the rent distributing capacity 
and actively participated in the real economy through the SEEs. This structure has 
changed with the new institutional framework that has come to exist after the 2001 crisis. 
The IMF conditionality and the harmonization efforts with the acquis communautaire 
were two influential factors in the making of the new institutional framework. They did 
not only inspire the Turkish policy makers for the nature of the reform agenda but also 
both IMF and EU performed strong monitoring functions in the timely and successful 
implementation of the reform agenda. The reform process in the end helped a new 
institutional framework to emerge. 
 
Independent regulatory agencies were established or empowered and took over a sizeable 
portion of this rent-distributing capacity of the state while the structural reforms opened 
up the way for rapid privatization. Both the rent-distributing capacity of the state and 
SEEs had been long used by politicians and bureaucrats for political or personal interests. 
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However, the new institutional framework blocked both of these avenues of populism. 
Thus the JDP had lesser room to engage in populist redistributive policy practices and 
abandon the fiscal discipline even if it aimed to do so.      
 
Third, the established networks that tie the economics and politics changed profoundly 
after the 2001 crisis. With a completely new parliamentary setting and powerful 
independent regulatory agencies, the way that the economy was regulated by the state has 
been altered. Powerful social groups and the lobbies of small distributive coalitions lost 
their influence over the state. They were used to pursue their narrow interests and often 
resist to reforms as they derived benefits from the status quo. However, the changing 
nature of political economic networks provided the opportunity for the JDP to override 
the pressures of these actors. The 2001 crisis also brought a more superior role and 
influence to the external anchors such as IMF and EU. The structural reforms, which are 
reinforced by these external anchors, were implemented swiftly as the status-quo seeking 
actors lost influence. The strengthening hand of IMF was particularly important for the 
long-lasting fiscal discipline as the Fund closely monitored the macroeconomic 
indicators. Within this new balance of power in the Turkish political economy, the JDP 
managed to maintain the fiscal discipline and the structural reform process. 
 
Fourth, the prudent political economy agenda of the JDP and the successful 
implementation of this agenda also played a central role in the post-2001 crisis Turkey. 
The JDP identified a window of opportunity as a strong economic recovery was already 
underway and after the 2001 crisis the public primarily sought for economic relief. The 
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previous coalition government collaborated with the IMF to produce a promising road 
map for the economic recovery and long-term stability. By successfully implementing 
this IMF-induced economic program, the JDP government could have put a stellar 
performance in comparison to many previous governments that were associated with 
major macroeconomic problems and political instabilities. But more importantly, by 
achieving stable and rapid economic growth the JDP had the opportunity to enlarge its 
electoral base without upsetting its existing electoral base. The core of this electoral base 
is the SMEs and there is normally a trade-off between meeting the expectations of big 
business and SMEs since these economic actors seek different policy implementations. 
However, after the destructive 2001 crisis these actors jointly prioritized economic 
recovery and then stable growth. JDP successfully saw this bigger picture and acted 
accordingly by keeping the fiscal discipline tight and continuing the reform process to 
successfully walk on the paths of EU membership and IMF program. 
 
While all these four different explanations are important in order to understand the long-
lasting fiscal discipline and structural reform process, the growing ties with global 
economy comes forward as it informs the other three explanations. The premature 
integration to the financial globalization without the adequate regulatory framework has 
been the number one source of the three major economic crises that the post 1989 Turkey 
suffered. On the other hand, the rapid recovery from the catastrophic 2001 crisis would 
not be possible if Turkey was not closely linked to the global economy. In other words, 
both the roots of the economic crisis and the cure of the major macroeconomic 
shortcomings lie within the global economy.  
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A basic summary of the main argument of this study could be given as follows.  
Figure 1 
 
Integration to the → The importance of  → Strengthening ↔ Institutional → Lesser room 
global economy        IMF conditionality        pro-reform               and              for political 
           X                    and EU accession             coalition           economic           populism 
Severe financial                 efforts                                                 reforms                  X 
        crisis                                                                                                             Stable and   
                                                                                                                             harmonious 
                                                                                                                                political  
                                                                                                                               authority 
 
→ Long lasting fiscal discipline and commitment to the economic program 
 
 
In the highly competitive climate of financial globalization, Turkey needs to draw a 
stable and promising picture for global financial actors in order to attract a sizeable 
portion of the global investments. Especially short-term macroeconomic problems such 
as the widening current account deficit and inadequate domestic savings consolidate 
Turkey’s dependence on the global economy. Global financial actors, which Turkey aims 
to attract, highly value the cooperation with the IMF and the EU accession process of 
Turkey, as these are important anchors of fiscal discipline and sustaining structural 
reform process. In the economic realm, the IMF conditionality is the key to set in motion 
the structural reforms and as a result of these structural reforms a new institutional 
framework has come to exist. This dependency on global economy also plays an 
important role in the making of the new balance of power in the Turkish political 
economy. Since the Turkish economy was in heavy need of foreign exchange supply, the 
influence of the global financial actors and IMF increased drastically while the 
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traditionally strong domestic social groups and distributive coalitions lost power. Also the 
window of opportunity that the JDP successfully identified and utilized had come to exist 
with the favorable international context. If the global liquidity were not so abundant and 
the risk appetite of global investors towards the risky emerging markets were not so high, 
the intense inflow of foreign funds would not take place in the first place and thus the 
rapid growth in 2002-2006 period could not be financed. 
 
The dependence on the global economy, therefore, is not a single explanation replacing 
others, for the long lasting fiscal discipline and structural reforms but it is the facilitating 
factor for the other three variables utilized in this study. Hence, it is safe to say that the 
growing ties with the global economy and the need for short-term foreign exchange 
supply are the most important elements shaping the post-2001 chapter of the Turkish 
political economy.  
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